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Populist and Progressive Strands in American
Constitutionalism
LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN
Modern constitutional law can best be understood as the product of
conflicting populist and progressive sensibilities with deep roots in the
nation’s past. Populist and progressive versions of constitutional law stem
from different versions of the corruption that the Constitution should
address. For progressives, corruption consists of contamination of
government expertise by ignorant and prejudiced mass opinion. In contrast,
populists distrust rationalistic, elite opinion. The corruption they fear is elite
government control that leads to the oppression of ordinary people by “their
betters.” Progressive “civil liberties” focus on protection of government
from mass hysteria and prejudice, while populist “civil liberties” focus on
protection from government dominated by elites.
This Article examines how this conflict has played out throughout the
twentieth century, with special emphasis on some iconic cases and events:
the Scopes Monkey Trial, Buck v. Bell, Skinner v. Oklahoma, West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, and the Warren Court experience. It
then discusses the reasons why, in modern times, populist constitutional
discourse has migrated from the left to the right side of the political
spectrum. A conclusion explores strategies for patching together a renewed
alliance between populists and progressives.
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Progressive and Populist Strands in American
Constitutionalism
LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN *
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1925, two titans of the American left1—William
Jennings Bryan and Clarence Darrow—showed up in the small town of
Dayton, Tennessee. Under a blazing sun, they battled over the conflicting
populist and progressive strands of the mainstream, American liberalism.2
The struggle concerned a newly enacted Tennessee statute that had the
effect of prohibiting teaching evolutionary theory in public schools. Bryan,
the populist, argued that the statute should be enforced. He did so in the
name of the dignity of ordinary people and evangelical Christianity. Darrow,
the progressive, argued against the statute. He did so in the name of science
and enlightenment values. The struggle ended inconclusively. John Scopes,
a young high school teacher, was convicted of violating the statute, but his
conviction was reversed on a technicality.3
Two years later, the same forces, although not the same players, clashed
again in the basement of the United States Capitol, where the United States
Supreme Court heard oral arguments. The dispute before the Court was
about a state eugenics statute that would lead to the sterilization of a young
woman, Carrie Buck.4 Bryan was now dead, but he had spent his last years
*

Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
Thanks to Jack Balkin, M. Gregg Bloche, Sheryll Cashin, Julie Cohen, Daniel Ernst, Michael
Kazin, Betsy Kuhn, Genevieve Lakier, Martin Lederman, David Luban, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Gary
Peller, James Sleeper, Russell Stevenson, Mark Tushnet, Raef Zreik, and participants at the Georgetown
Law Center Faculty Workshop for useful suggestions. I could not have written this Article without
outstanding research assistance from Casey Chalbeck and Caitlin VerBrugge.
1
Darrow spent his professional life representing radicals and labor organizers. ANDREW E.
KERSTEN, CLARENCE DARROW: AMERICAN ICONOCLAST 121 (2011). Bryan ran for President three times
as an opponent of plutocracy and class privilege. MICHAEL KAZIN, A GODLY HERO: THE LIFE OF
WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN xiii (2006) [hereinafter KAZIN, A GODLY HERO].
2
“Populism,” “progressivism,” and “American liberalism” are all vague terms with contested
meanings. By “American liberalism,” I mean a political orientation that emphasizes the inequalities and
power imbalances produced by private markets and favors redistribution to correct these imbalances. As
we shall see, although populists and progressives shared this orientation, they disagreed about the source
of the problem, the appropriate solutions, and the intersection between the problem and protection for
civil liberties. See infra Part I (explaining how I use the terms “populism” and “progressivism”).
3
For a detailed account of the trial, see EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS: THE SCOPES
TRIAL AND AMERICA’S CONTINUING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION 87–146 (1997).
4
For histories of the controversy, see ADAM COHEN, IMBECILES: THE SUPREME COURT, AMERICAN
EUGENICS, AND THE STERILIZATION OF CARRIE BUCK 253–54, 270 (2016); PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE
GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL (2008).
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strongly attacking eugenics, and his populist allies shared his views.5
Although Darrow himself opposed eugenics,6 most of his progressive allies
strongly favored the practice as a manifestation of scientific rationality.7
This time, the outcome was hardly inconclusive. In an 8–1 decision with the
majority opinion written by Oliver Wendell Holmes and joined by
progressive champion Louis Brandeis, the Court held that “[t]hree
generations of imbeciles are enough” and upheld the sterilization order.8
All of this happened many years ago. One might have thought that
passions would have cooled. And yet, almost a century later, the struggle
between populists and progressives continues. As political scientists Gary
Miller and Norman Schofield point out, the angry emotions that Bryan and
Darrow ignited over the intersection of social and religious issues on the one
hand and political and cultural power on the other remain central to our
politics.9 Even more surprisingly, the disputes remain at the center of
modern constitutional law. Only recently, Justice Clarence Thomas devoted
nineteen pages of the United States Reports to an impassioned attack on
eugenics and Darwinian thought, which he associated with “progressives,
professionals, and intellectual elites.”10 Thomas’s opinion is hardly
aberrational. Both he and some of his colleagues regularly enrage
constitutional progressives when they rehearse populist complaints against
elite control of government institutions and elite denigration of the religious
and other convictions of “ordinary Americans.” 11
On the other side, progressive Supreme Court Justices defend the value
of science, condemn the penetration of religion into the public sphere, and
support the independence and expertise of executive branch agencies. They
regularly enrage conservative populists with the claim that traditional beliefs
about marriage, gender, sex, and abortion are manifestations of
unconstitutional discrimination.12 Darrow and Bryan would have had no
trouble recognizing this rhetoric.
It is not as if nothing has changed, however. The arguments in Scopes
and Buck were intermural fights on the left. Today, liberals have retained
their allegiance to progressive values, but the political valence of populism
has shifted. Miller and Schofield point out that “[William Jennings] Bryan’s
position on social policy issues is now ascendant in the Republican Party”13
5

See infra pp. 432–33.
See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
7
See infra p. 432–33.
8
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
9
See Gary Miller & Norman Schofield, The Transformation of the Republican and Democratic
Party Coalitions in the U.S., 6 PERSPS. ON POL. 433, 435 fig.2, 436 (2008) (discussing modern salience
of Bryan’s vision and continuing relevance of the dispute between elites and agrarian populists).
10
Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 286–88 and accompanying text.
11
See infra note 346 and accompanying text.
12
See infra pp. 463–67.
13
Miller & Schofield, supra note 9, at 446.
6
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and that transformation is also beginning to extend to economic issues.14
Once again, the transmogrification has important parallels in constitutional
rhetoric. It is now usually the Supreme Court’s most conservative Justices
who are the most fervent defenders of populist constitutionalism.15
How did this happen? This Article traces the strange history of populist
and progressive constitutionalism over the last century. It argues that our
modern constitutional history is best understood as an argument over
conflicting populist and progressive worldviews and that much of our
current difficulties can be traced to the migration of populist thought from
the left to the right.
The story is confused and complicated because the populist and
progressive movements overlapped and because politicians and political
movements cannot be reduced to simple, coherent ideologies. Still, if we treat
“populism” and “progressivism” as ideal types,16 a revealing pattern emerges.
The beginning point is the contrasting stances taken by populists and
progressives regarding ordinary, nonconstitutional disputes. Both populists
and progressives worried about the interaction between markets and public
power, but their focuses differed. Speaking very broadly, the populist
impulse located the source of economic oppression in government
corruption. According to this story, corrupt politicians have handed out
special privileges to private interests who have used their authority to create
monopoly power and to suppress small-scale enterprise. The solution to this
problem is direct, popular democracy, which will prevent plutocratic
government capture.17
In contrast, the progressive impulse tended to locate the source of
economic oppression in the malfunction of private markets. According to
this story, private individuals use markets to help themselves and inflict
injury on others. The solution to this problem is government regulation by
elite experts shielded from direct popular control.18
14

Miller and Schofield observe that:
In the long-run, the same dynamic could actually make the Republican Party more
blue-collar than the Democrats. Social conservatives in the Republican Party already
insist that the Democratic Party is the party of privilege and elitism. The populist
rhetoric adopted by the Republican Party has pictured the Democratic Party as the
home of overpaid professors, bureaucrats, and social technicians. Democrats are seen
as “limousine liberals” who want to indulge themselves in expensive proenvironmental policy, and who have nothing to lose when wages collapse to the levels
of Third World countries.

Id. at 446–47.
See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
16
Cf. J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935,
1944 (1995) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993)
(treating populist and progressive constitutional sensibilities as ideal types).
17
See infra pp. 422–23.
18
See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
15
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How do these general tendencies translate into constitutional law? One
might expect populist distrust of government to produce populist support for
civil liberties, minority rights, and limited government. If the rich inevitably
control the levers of power, the sensible response is to utilize the Constitution
to protect individuals from government encroachment. Conversely, one might
expect progressive faith in government to produce support for civil liberties
skepticism. In a world where the government is a force for social justice, it
makes no sense to empower courts to obstruct its work.
There are strands of both populism and progressivism that cohere with
this narrative. Populists occasionally invoked civil liberties, as when, for
example, they defended the right of Coxey’s Army to assemble,19 or attacked
the use of military force against the Pullman Strike.20 At least at some points
in its history, populism also made efforts to establish common ground with
racial minorities.21
However, populists are better known for disparaging or disregarding
civil liberties. There is more than a hint of antisemitism and racism in some
populist rhetoric.22 Populists were also more sympathetic to government
intervention than one might expect. Although many populists tried to tie the
movement to Jeffersonian democracy, they nonetheless favored an
expansive view of congressional powers that would, for example, lead to
public ownership of railroads and means of communication.23

19
See JOHN D. HICKS, THE POPULIST REVOLT: A HISTORY OF THE FARMERS’ ALLIANCE AND THE
PEOPLE’S PARTY 322–23 (1961) (detailing populist support for Coxey’s Army).
20
See id. at 322 (detailing populist criticism of President Cleveland for using federal troops in the
Pullman Strike).
21
See JOSEPH GERTEIS, CLASS AND THE COLOR LINE: INTERRACIAL CLASS COALITION IN THE
KNIGHTS OF LABOR AND THE POPULIST MOVEMENT 49–50 (2007) (discussing populist efforts to achieve
interracial coalition). See also Lawrence C. Goodwyn, Populist Dreams and Negro Rights: East Texas
as a Case Study, 76 AM. HIST. REV. 1435, 1436 (1971) (case study of populism in Grimes County, Texas,
showing that populism was based on “a black-white coalition that had its genesis in Reconstruction and
endured for more than a generation”); John A. Powell, The Race and Class Nexus: An Intersectional
Perspective, 25 LAW & INEQ. 355, 375 (2007) (“In the early expression of the Populist movement, it was
the southern White populist leadership that realized the need for multiracial coalitions in order to
succeed.”). But cf. Sheryll D. Cashin, Democracy, Race, and Multiculturalism in the Twenty-First
Century: Will the Voting Rights Act Ever Be Obsolete?, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 71, 82 (2006) (“In
the end, any possibilities for a sustained, interracial political alliance were defeated by exploiting whites’
fear of being dominated by Negroes.”).
22
See, e.g., MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 10 (2017 prtg.)
[hereinafter KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION] (quoting populist Tom Watson complaining that “redeyed Jewish millionaires” had become the “chiefs” of the Democratic Party); LAWRENCE GOODWYN,
THE POPULIST MOMENT: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLT IN AMERICA 325 (1978)
(explaining that some Populist leaders became white supremacists).
23
See GOODWYN, supra note 22, at 319 n.* (noting that populists were sympathetic to Jefferson,
but unlike Jefferson, they were not dedicated to small government); Thomas Goebel, The Political
Economy of American Populism from Jackson to the New Deal, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 109, 122 (1997)
(noting that populists favored regulation of railroads due to the perception that they were “governmentsponsored monopolies”).
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Conversely, as one might expect, early progressives tended toward civil
liberties skepticism and were sometimes unsympathetic to minority rights.24
They were especially hostile to judicial review that limited government
power.25 Some progressives, like Justice Felix Frankfurter, for example,
insisted on deference toward the political branches in civil liberties cases
well into the mid-twentieth century.26
But at least since the New Deal revolution, many progressives have
embraced causes like free speech, abortion rights, Fourth Amendment rights,
and judicially enforced gender and racial equality.27 Even as progressives
have trusted government when it intervenes in economic affairs, they have
adopted a posture of distrust regarding matters like the regulation of speech,
search and seizure law, and statutes limiting sexual and reproductive freedom.
What explains this disjunction? No one explanation fits all the fact, but
in this Article, I emphasize a particular source for the paradox: populists and
progressives had different views about public corruption, and these different
views produced counterintuitive positions with regard to civil liberties and
minority rights. Progressives were believers in progress, science, and
rationalism. They favored a strong government run by experts who would
rationalize and equalize private markets.28 The corruption that they feared
was the contamination of that expertise by ignorant and prejudiced mass
opinion. Their embrace of civil liberties is easy to misunderstand.
Superficially, their support for the claims of minorities against government
overreach looks like support for limited government that is in tension with
their support for government regulation in the economic sphere. What often
actually motivated them, however, was a desire to protect the government
against the threat posed by an unschooled populace. What they labeled as
protection for minorities was instead opposition to popular interference with
governing elites. In that sense, progressive support for what they called
“civil liberties” was consistent with their pro-government stance.
24
See David M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of Free
Speech in American History, 45 STAN. L. REV. 47, 53 (1992) (describing progressive ambivalence toward
free speech prior to World War I); David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive Social Thought, 74
TEX. L. REV. 951, 958–62 (1996) (expanding upon the progressive ambivalence toward free speech prior
to World War I); DAVID W. SOUTHERN, THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND RACE: REACTION AND REFORM,
1900–1917, at 47–54 (2005) (describing progressive racism).
25
See generally WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS
CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937 (1994) (discussing progressive hostility toward judicial review).
26
See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517, 520–21 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the conviction of leaders of the Communist Party for
advocating a forceful overthrow of the United States government); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26
(1949) (rejecting application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states).
27
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising the Progressive State, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1063, 1064–
65 (2017) (noting that progressives favored “deferential judicial review of economic legislation . . . but
harsher review of provisions that adversely affect underrepresented minorities or impair the practice of
fundamental rights”).
28
See, e.g., id. at 1064 (identifying progressivism with the use of scientific evidence, a commitment
to nonmarket institutions, and policy making by government agencies).
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In contrast, populism was often rooted in nostalgia for the past rather
than hope for the future.29 Populist politicians typically represented
constituents whose culture and livelihood were endangered by rapid
economic and social change.30 Distrust of the rationalistic, elite opinion that
drove that change produced a different and less familiar, if no less vibrant,
version of civil liberties. The corruption that they feared was elite
government control that led to the oppression of ordinary people by “their
betters.”31 In that sense, populist distrust of the progressive view of “civil
liberties” was consistent with their distrust of government.
If this story is correct, then most people who have studied and participated
in the last century’s constitutional debate have misunderstood what is going
on. Conventional accounts pit popular sovereignty against individual rights.
In this framing, courts are caught in a dilemma between the argument for
democratic self-rule and the argument for minority rights.32 That dilemma, in
turn, is supposedly resolved by justificatory theories premised on
originalism,33 representation reinforcement,34 moral philosophy,35 or common
law constitutionalism.36
But this is not the best way to account for the actual behavior of
progressives and populists. Their actual behavior suggests that claims about
democracy and individual rights were only instrumentally useful and that
methods of constitutional interpretation were epiphenomenal. The real
argument was between the empowerment of educated experts and of
“ordinary people.” When “experts” were in control of government, as they
were when Virginia enacted its eugenics statute, progressives favored
majoritarianism and populists favored individual rights. When “ordinary
people” were in control, as they were when Tennessee enacted its
29
See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 24 (1955)
(discussing populist nostalgia). Cf. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, ANTI-PLURALISM: THE POPULIST THREAT TO
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 4 (2018) (associating modern populism with longing “for an imagined past that
insurgent politicians promised to restore”). Populism also had a utopian strain that pointed in vague and
sweeping terms to a humane and just future, best exemplified by EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING
BACKWARD: 2000–1887, at iv–vi (1888). But as Bellamy’s title suggests, hopes for the future were often
grounded in a sense of loss in the present.
30
See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
31
Cf. Balkin, supra note 16, at 1946 (noting that populists believed that people wanted “to
participate in government, but they [did] not wish to be manipulated and shaped by some master plan for
effective governance. They want[ed] the opportunity to have a say in what affect[ed] them, but they also
wish[ed] to be allowed to live their lives, raise their children, and pursue their own vision of happiness
. . . free from the hand of bureaucratic planning, or corporate overreaching”).
32
For a classic statement of the dilemma, see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2–3 (1971).
33
See, e.g., id. at 3 (arguing that the Supreme Court should be bound by intent of the Framers).
34
See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980) (arguing for representation reinforcement as a means of reconciling judicial power with democracy).
35
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 96–98 (1986) (arguing that interpreters should
make the morally best use of legal material).
36
See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879
(1996) (describing and defending common law mode of constitutional interpretation).
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anti-evolution statute, populists favored majoritarianism and progressives
favored individual rights.
This formulation represents a substantial departure from the standard—
some would say tired—story about our constitutional disagreements. The
standard story treats the New Deal as a pivot point, marking a transition from
a suddenly discredited jurisprudence resting on classical legal thought to a
new world that had to contend with and domesticate the insights drawn from
legal realism. On this telling, in the wake of Lochner’s demise, some Justices
on the Roosevelt Court opted for judicial restraint, while others embraced a
version of judicial review that ignored economic rights but protected civil
liberties, political rights, and “discrete and insular minorities.”37 In complex
ways and for complicated reasons, that division eventually morphed into a
dispute between originalism and living constitutionalism.
Of course, this story tells us things that are useful to know. It is not the
whole story, though, and it leaves some important things unexplained. For
example, it fails to explain how conservatives have successfully coopted
populist constitutionalism and turned it into a mass movement centered on
deregulation. It does not explain why progressive constitutionalists found it
necessary somehow to reconcile libertarian views with regard to certain
individual rights with a faith in government regulation with regard to
everything else. My hope for this Article is that a different way of organizing
our constitutional experience will yield different insights and explanations that
provide an alternative account of our current dilemmas and controversies.
Part I sets the stage for this account by explaining the way in which I
use the labels “populist” and “progressive.” These labels are tied to historical
events occurring in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As used
here, though, the labels are meant to identify sensibilities and tendencies that
transcend the events that gave rise to the labels.
With this definitional work completed, I begin the story in Part II.
Because the story itself is nonstandard, it has a nonstandard starting point.
On this account, in the beginning there was not John Marshall’s
confrontation with Thomas Jefferson, enactment of the Reconstruction
Amendments, the court-packing episode, or the NAACP’s campaign against
racial subordination. Instead, the story begins with the two dramatic
historical events described above: the Scopes Monkey Trial of 1925 where a
court found a school teacher guilty of the “crime” of teaching evolution,38
and the Supreme Court’s decision two years later in Buck v. Bell, where the
Justices allowed the sterilization of a young woman under a
eugenics-inspired statute.39
37
See, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 108–20 (3d ed. 2000)
(describing this history); see generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992) (same).
38
Cf. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 108 (1927) (reversing the conviction secured at the trial).
39
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
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In the popular imagination, the Scopes trial is a morality play pitting
know-nothing religious prejudice against modern science and oppressive state
orthodoxy against individual freedom. Buck, part of our anti-canon, is often
characterized in a similar fashion. On this version, Carrie Buck’s individual
rights were sacrificed on the altar of government prejudice and ignorance.
But this treatment of the two cases produces a disturbing puzzle: Why
were progressives on the side of individual rights in Scopes but on the side
of government power in Buck? Why did populists defend Carrie Buck’s right
to procreate but not John Scopes’s right to teach? The contradiction can be
resolved by understanding what really divided populists and progressives.
Justice Holmes’s majority opinion in Buck and Clarence Darrow’s defense
of Scopes were both manifestations of the progressive view of civil liberties,
which saw the primary threat to freedom as government capitulation in the
face of uninformed and unintelligent mass opinion. Bryan’s defense of the
Tennessee anti-evolution statute and his attacks on eugenics were
expressions of the competing, populist view of civil liberties, which saw the
primary threat as elite attacks on popular belief systems and on the very
existence of “ordinary people.”40
Part III explores the way in which the argument between populists and
progressives, illustrated by the Scopes and Buck controversies, continued in
their immediate aftermath. On standard accounts,41 modern constitutionalism
grows out of the court-packing controversy and the Supreme Court’s iconic
footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products.42 Instead, I emphasize
two cases that reinterpret Scopes and Buck. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,43
populists and progressives were able to unite around the outcome when the
Court invalidated a eugenics program on Equal Protection grounds. But the
argument resumed when the Court turned to compulsory flag salutes in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.44
Part IV extends the argument into the modern period and discusses how
it has influenced disputes about prayer in schools, racial justice, reproductive
rights, free speech, reapportionment, and criminal procedure.
Part V discusses internal contradictions in both the populist and
progressive traditions. Briefly stated, the problem for populists is explaining
how economic oppression could possibly be remedied without systematic
government intervention. This problem left populists vulnerable to a
conservative takeover that recast populist insights into a deregulatory program.
The problem for progressives is explaining how elite control of government

40
For a discussion of the ambition of many eugenicists to eliminate large segments of the
population, see infra text accompanying notes 162–66.
41
See infra notes 243–44 and accompanying text.
42
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
43
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
44
West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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could be reconciled with the interests of ordinary people. This problem left
progressives isolated and vulnerable when attacked by rightwing populists.
The final part concludes by asking what steps we might take to resolve the
contradictions that have produced many of our current constitutional difficulties.
I. POPULISTS AND PROGRESSIVES
This is not the place for an extended historical examination of the
populist and progressive movements as they played out in the United States.
Historians continue to argue about the aims, composition, and character of
these movements, and I am hardly in a position to resolve the disagreement
or even to contribute much to the debate. In truth, like all political movements,
populism and progressivism were amorphous and contradictory.45 Even the
participants in the movements were uncertain about their meaning and scope.
For the most part, these participants were not political philosophers. Their
responses were determined more by the pressure of immediate events than
by a worked out political theory. While there is undoubtedly a “there there,”
its boundaries are uncertain and contested.
For these reasons, it is important to guard against essentialism and
oversimplification. That said, there is also a risk that runs in the opposite
direction. Yes, individual advocates of populism and progressivism were
complex bundles of sometimes contradictory ideas. Still, one cannot even
begin to talk about the ideas, much less the contradictions within them,
without organizing them in some formal, necessarily overly simple fashion.
Of course, other organizations are possible, but some organization is
necessary and all organizations are vulnerable to the charge of essentialism.
For my argument to go through, then, it is necessary that the competing
sensibilities that I identify are at least loosely tied to historical events and
movements, but the argument does not depend on whether any particular
person who identified herself as a populist or progressive actually held all
the views that I ascribe to the movements. In what follows, I use some
particular actors and particular historical events—what these actors said and
did—to illustrate and dramatize my point. The point stands even though it is
possible to tell the story in a different way. What ultimately matters is that
the competing sensibilities I describe once existed, that they exist today, and
that they help to explain some of the problems we currently face.
In the two sections that follow, I describe these competing sensibilities to
which, perhaps by stipulation, I assign the labels “populist” and “progressive.”

45
See, e.g., CAS MUDDE & CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER, POPULISM: A VERY SHORT
INTRODUCTION 2 (2017) (noting that populism “truly is an essentially contested concept”); NORMAN
POLLACK, THE JUST POLITY: POPULISM, LAW, AND HUMAN WELFARE 3 (1987) (characterizing populism
as “a remarkably varied movement” and arguing that “[t]he conventional wisdom about its nature can be
contradicted at every turn”).
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A. Populists
The populist movement of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
was a left-wing political revolt. The populist program included progressive
taxation, redistribution of income, and control of corporate power.46
Predominantly rural and agrarian, the revolt grew out of a set of historical
circumstances—in particular, the deflationary policies pursued by the
federal government after the Civil War,47 rapid industrialization, the rise of
“big business” and the corporate structure, widespread corruption in
government, and the decline of the cultural hegemony of rural America.48
Although these events occurred in a particular time and place, they
produced a sensibility that transcends these particularities. It is marked by a
nostalgia for a partially imagined and rapidly receding past49 and an anger at
the people who are destroying a perceived golden age.50 The anger, in turn,
expressed itself in a Manichean view of politics. On one side are “the
people”—an undifferentiated mass that is good and noble and that has
common interests and views. On the other side are “the interests”—a small
minority in control of the government and the culture that is determined to
oppress the people in order to achieve its own selfish objectives.51
What was the remedy for these problems? Because the interests have
corrupted the government, some solutions involve self-help and localism.52
The Grange Movement and the growth of farmer cooperatives reflect this
impulse.53 In part, though, and in tension with their views about government
corruption, many populists favored strong government action like the
46
For a short summary of populist aims, see GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, THE TRAGEDY OF WILLIAM
JENNINGS BRYAN: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF BACKLASH 37–38 (2011).
47
See GOODWYN, supra note 22, at 8–19 (describing deflationary policies).
48
See Goebel, supra note 23, at 120–24 (describing conditions that gave rise to populism);
GOODWYN supra note 22, at 3–93 (same); HOFSTADTER, supra note 29, at 7 (associating populism with
the rapid decline of rural America). Cf. Cas Mudde & Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism and
(Liberal) Democracy: A Framework for Analysis, in POPULISM IN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS: THREAT
OR CORRECTIVE FOR DEMOCRACY? 1, 3 (Cas Mudde & Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser eds., 2012)
(asserting that a “commonality” of populist movements was “an agrarian programme in which the
peasantry was seen as the main pillar of both society and economy”).
For a discussion of American populism’s roots in the antebellum period, see KAZIN, THE
POPULIST PERSUASION, supra note 22, at 9–25. For discussions of populism as an international
phenomenon, see generally Mudde & Kaltwasser, supra.
49
See GALSTON, supra note 29, at 4 (describing populist nostalgia).
50
Id. at 13–14.
51
See, e.g., id. at 36 (asserting that populists distinguish between the “people” and the “elites,” with
each group treated as homogeneous and the two interests fundamentally opposed); Mudde & Kaltwasser,
supra note 48, at 8 (asserting “that every manifestation of populism criticizes the existence of powerful
minorities, which in one way or another are obstructing the will of the common people”). Cf. KAZIN,
THE POPULIST PERSUASION, supra note 22, at 31 (“With privilege now resting securely in the saddle,
[populist] literature of reform bristled with narratives of degeneration, conspiracy, and betrayal.”).
52
See, e.g., POLLACK, supra note 45, at 108 (noting that populists favored abolition of “[s]pecial
advantages conferred by the state,” but “that the purpose of removing obstructions was to throw
individuals on their own mettle”).
53
See MAGLIOCCA, supra note 46, at 36 (discussing the grange movement).
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nationalization of the railroads and means of communication. The tension
was partially resolved by their commitment to direct popular democracy—
measures like the referendum, initiative, and recall.54 Because the
government had been corrupted by the interests, and because the people are
“good,” the people must seize control of governmental power. They can do
so by direct action that will displace the compromised politicians
administering a plutocracy.55
Although populists regularly lost national elections, they are widely
credited with achieving important reforms. The movement also had a
downside, however. The Manichean mindset left populists vulnerable to
conspiracy theories, some of which were quite bizarre. Moreover, despite
what populists said, “the people” are not, in fact, an undifferentiated mass.
In order to make their ideology work, the theory had to identify “the people”
with some people. That tendency, when combined with a conspiratorial
mindset, sometimes led to antisemitism, xenophobia, and racism that
tarnished the movement.56
B. Progressives
There is considerable overlap between the populist and progressive
movements. Both were founded in part on status anxiety, and the movements
often shared similar aims, including the taming of unbridled corporate power
and a redistribution of wealth in favor of the less fortunate. For our purposes,
though, it is important to emphasize the differences.
Whereas populists were worried about the decline of rural America,
progressives tended to be middle or even upper class and urban. They felt
themselves squeezed between the influx of immigrants “corrupting” urban
government on the one hand and the growth of newly wealthy “captains of
industry” on the other. Against these forces, progressives imagined
themselves as sensible centrists who could be neutral arbiters between
working class radicalism and heartless plutocracy.57 Whereas populists were

54
See Balkin, supra note 16, at 1945 (noting that populists favored “regular rotations of positions
of authority and power” and “popular participation in economic and political structures that affect the
lives of ordinary citizens.”). On populist ambivalence about strong government, see KAZIN, THE
POPULIST PERSUASION, supra note 22, at 41–42.
55
See POLLACK, supra note 45, at 5, 8 (arguing that populists “viewed the political economy as a
system of emergent monopolism that had . . . denied the autonomous existence of the state as the
custodian of individual security and the nation’s welfare” and that populists thought that the solution to
this problem was “an alteration of values and social relations, the formation of a public standard, and the
redistribution of power” that would nonetheless leave private property in place).
56
See HOFSTADTER, supra note 29, at 61 (describing populist tendencies toward racism and
xenophobia); GALSTON, supra note 29, at 65 (same).
57
See HOFSTADTER, supra note 29, at 163 (characterizing eastern progressivism as “a mild and
judicious movement, whose goal was not a sharp change in the social structure, but rather the formation
of a responsible elite, which was to take charge of the popular impulse toward change and direct it into
moderate and, as they would have said, ‘constructive’ channels”); KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION,
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nostalgic for a lost past, progressives thought that they could lead the country
toward a sensible and humane future.58
Progressives were much less drawn to conspiracy theories than
populists, and they were therefore less concerned with an imagined
worldwide force that had taken control of government. For many
progressives, government was the solution rather than the problem.
Government could be the agent of the moderate reform that they favored,
but in order to accomplish this reform, it had to be populated by fair-minded
experts.59 Direct popular control often obstructed the ability of these
technocrats to do their work.60 Public opinion was often fickle, uninformed,
and prejudiced.61 Regulators needed to be at least partially shielded from
popular control lest they lose their neutrality and their ability to pursue
solutions that were complex rather than simple.62
Like populism, progressivism both produced important reforms and was
tarnished by important weaknesses. Progressives succeeded in actually
utilizing the levers of government power to produce a more just polity by,
for example, providing a social safety net and protecting the right of workers
to organize. Like the populists, however, their concern about the changing
demographics of the country sometimes led to xenophobia and racism.63
Moreover, the progressive impulse to depoliticize public policy tended to
produce a blindness about good faith moral disagreement. Some
progressives smugly assumed that their positions were value-free and
“scientific” and that opposing views were ignorant and prejudiced.64
Whereas populists were, perhaps, unduly pessimistic about the extent of
government corruption by the interests, progressives were unduly ingenuous
about problems of agency capture and interest group control.
supra note 22, at 51 (asserting that “[p]rogressives sought to harmonize . . . legitimate but partial interests
for the sake of the larger ‘public interest’”).
58
See, e.g., HOFSTADTER, supra note 29, at 148–63 (emphasizing future orientation of progressives).
59
See id. at 155 (“The development of regulative and humane legislation required the skills of
lawyers and economists, sociologists and political scientists, in the writing of laws and in the staffing of
administrative and regulative bodies.”).
60
Cf. GALSTON, supra note 29, at 4 (noting that elitist “efforts to insulate themselves from the
people—in the quasi-invisible civil service, in remote bureaucracies, in courts and international
institutions—inevitably breed resentment”).
61
See Balkin, supra note 16, at 1947 (asserting that progressives believed “[p]opular anger and
uneducated public sentiments are more likely to lead to hasty and irrational judgments”); KAZIN, THE
POPULIST PERSUASION, supra note 22, at 52 (noting progressive “skepticism about the masses” and belief
that reform was possible only when the people were “guided by a skilled, perceptive counter-elite”).
62
For a famous, book-length exposition of progressive distrust of public opinion, see generally
WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION (1922).
63
See generally SOUTHERN, supra note 24 (describing progressive racism). Cf. C. VANN WOODWARD,
ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 1877–1913, at 369–95 (1951) (describing progressive racism in the south).
But see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Progressives: Racism and Public Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 947 (2017)
(arguing that progressives “inherited” racist attitudes but ultimately destroyed scientific racism).
64
See GALSTON, supra note 29, at 4 (“[Elitists] are sure that they are promoting the public interest,
but they understand it through the prism of their own class interests and biases.”).
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How did these competing sensibilities influence the development of
modern constitutional law? That is the subject of the next Parts. The story
might be recounted abstractly and generally. Instead, I relate it in the context
of a few specific and dramatic historical events and court decisions.
II. OF MONKEYS AND IMBECILES: EVOLUTION, EUGENICS, AND THE
MEANING OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
A. The Showdown in Dayton
Part publicity stunt, part morality play, part farce, and part deadly
serious cultural battle, the Scopes Monkey Trial commands our attention
almost a century after its inconclusive end. Much of that attention, though,
focuses on the riveting personalities involved or on issues that were not
really at the center of the controversy. Once one refocuses on what was
actually at stake, one begins to perceive a direct line between the trial and
disputes that animate modern constitutional law.
The trial was originally the brainchild of community leaders in the small
town of Dayton, Tennessee. They had little ideological interest in either
evolution or biblical literalism. Instead, their objectives were secular. They
thought that a “test case” involving the state’s new statute prohibiting publicly
funded schools from teaching “any theory that denies the story of the divine
creation of man as taught in the Bible,” would spark much-needed economic
activity.65 At the beginning, everyone understood that there would be no hard
feelings.66 John Scopes, himself, may never have taught evolution67 and
openly cooperated with the prosecution so as to put on a good show.68
Things changed when, over the opposition and doubts of some of the
original participants,69 William Jennings Bryan and Clarence Darrow
arrived on the scene. Bryan was a hero to many populists. He had run for
president three times and served as Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of State but
was now retired from politics.70 He nonetheless retained a huge following and
had spent years of his life campaigning against evolutionary theory and
arguing for laws that prohibited the teaching of the theory in public schools.71
65

See LARSON, supra note 3, at 89, 171 (describing origins of the trial).
See id. at 91–92. (describing friendly relationships between trial’s antagonists).
67
Id. at 173–74.
68
See id. at 89–92 (discussing the prosecutor’s recruitment of Scopes as a willing defendant).
69
Darrow was not the ACLU’s first choice for counsel, and “his strong personality and provocative
tactics upstaged the ACLU’s intended message.” LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH:
AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPROMISE 148 (2016). Indeed, the ACLU made repeated attempts to
displace Darrow. LARSON, supra note 3, at 102. In contrast, although the prosecution welcomed Bryan’s
arrival, id. at 99, they must have entertained doubts about his courtroom abilities. Bryan had not practiced
law in over thirty years, id. at 98, and had little interest in debating the truth of evolution in a courtroom
setting. Id. at 104.
70
See KAZIN, A GODLY HERO, supra note 1, at 76–77, 107–08, 164, 216, 237–42 (describing
Bryan’s career).
71
Id. at 271–77.
66
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Darrow, the most famous trial lawyer of his time, had prevailed in many
seemingly hopeless cases. He was a tireless defender of labor and of radicalism
and a notorious religious skeptic and advocate of material determinism.72
When these two giants showed up, the case turned into a media circus
climaxed by Darrow’s dramatic decision to call Bryan himself to the stand
as an expert on the Bible.73 In the suffocating heat, Darrow mercilessly
badgered Bryan about biblical literalism.74 A huge throng watched on an
outdoor platform, where the trial had been moved for fear that the courtroom
floor would collapse.75 Millions more followed the trial through a primitive
radio hook up and the print media.76 The jury’s guilty verdict, reached after
only minutes of deliberation, was anticlimactic, but high drama returned
when Bryan died suddenly a few days after the trial.77 By the time the
episode concluded, it had become the stuff of American legend.78
The legend has tended to obscure what was actually at stake in the case.
On one level, the answer is not much. Even after Darrow and Bryan became
involved, there were many indications that the participants were not playing
for keeps. There was never a risk that Scopes would be incarcerated or even
lose his job.79 Bryan, who had always opposed attaching penalties to
antievolution statutes, graciously offered to pay Scopes’s modest fine.80
Even had he lived, Bryan would not have had to make good on the offer
because the Tennessee Supreme Court found a technicality that allowed it to
reverse the jury’s verdict.81 The court urged the prosecution not to retry the
case,82 and the prosecutors promptly acquiesced.83
The absence of the high personal stakes that often accompany criminal
trials only serves to emphasize the symbolic stakes. But what, exactly, were
those stakes? Two related conventional accounts do not quite fit the facts.
On the first view, Bryan and Darrow symbolize religious ignorance and
obscurantism pitted against free inquiry and scientific rationalism. This is
the way that H.L. Menken characterized the trial in his famous dispatches
72
On Darrow’s defense of labor, see KERSTEN, supra note 1, at 107–51. On his religious
skepticism, see id. at 221–22. On his material determinism, see id. at 197.
73
LARSON, supra note 3, at 187–90.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 167, 186–87.
76
Id. at 142, 203.
77
Id. at 191, 199–204.
78
For an account, see id. at 204–06, 225–28.
79
Id. at 200–01.
80
Id. at 244.
81
The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the judgment on the ground that “a jury alone can impose
the penalty this Act requires” that “the trial judge exceeded his jurisdiction in levying this fine,” and that
the court was “without power to correct his error.” Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 121 (1927).
82
See id. (“We see nothing to be gained by prolonging the life of this bizarre case. On the contrary
we think the peace and dignity of the State, which all criminal prosecutions are brought to redress, will
be the better conserved by the entry of a nolle prosequi herein. Such a course is suggested to the AttorneyGeneral.”).
83
LARSON, supra note 3, at 221.
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from Dayton84 and how Frederick Lewis Allen presented the case in his
bestselling book published six years after the trial.85 It was the dramatic focal
point for Inherit the Wind, the Broadway play and movie based on the trial.
It was how Darrow himself meant to frame the controversy when his
examination of Bryan revealed Bryan’s scientific illiteracy and the
absurdities produced by biblical literalism.86
Unfortunately, though, this framing oversimplifies the controversy.
Consider first the “scientific” basis for Darrow’s position. If not still in its
infancy, evolutionary biology was undergoing a turbulent adolescence in
1925. Its scientific status was contested and shaky.87 Evolutionists themselves
were divided between Darwinian and Lamarckian versions,88 and the
Lamarckian theory, still endorsed by important scientists in 1925, was more
compatible with biblical literalism.89 There remained important holes in the
Darwinian account for which there were not yet adequate explanations.90
It gets worse. Perhaps the most important archeological evidence in
support of Darwinian theory was the Piltdown Man, discovered some thirty
miles from Darwin’s home in 1909 on the fiftieth anniversary of the
publication of Origin of Species. The discovery was hailed by the leading
experts on human development.91 According to the highly regarded biologist
Boyd Dawkins, “The evidence was clear that this discovery revealed a

84
For a compilation of the dispatches, see H.L. Mencken, “The Monkey Trial”: A Reporter’s
Account, FAMOUS TRIALS, https://famous-trials.com/scopesmonkey/2132-menckenaccount (last visited
Mar. 3, 2021).
85
FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE NINETEENTWENTIES 199–206 (1931).
86
For a transcript, see NAT’L BOOK CO., THE WORLD’S MOST FAMOUS COURT TRIAL: TENNESSEE
EVOLUTION CASE 284–304 (1925) [hereinafter TENNESSEE EVOLUTION CASE].
87
See Patrick Dassen & Mary G. Kemperink, Introduction, in XIV THE MANY FACES OF
EVOLUTION IN EUROPE, C. 1860–1914, at xi (Patrick Dassen & Mary Kemperink eds., 2005) (noting that
“[a]round 1900 the theory of natural selection was so unpopular that Darwin’s opponents believed that it
would never recover” and that “[i]t was only in the late 1930s . . . that natural selection was accepted as
the main mechanism of evolution”).
88
Lamarck is commonly taken to have held that species inherited acquired characteristics. See C.
LEON HARRIS, EVOLUTION: GENESIS AND REVELATIONS 110 (1981) (“Most people who know of
Lamarck at all associate his name with the ‘inheritance of acquired character’—the so-called Lamarckian
Principle.”). His views were actually somewhat more complex. He thought that “changes in conditions
create new needs for an organism, and the degree of use of an organ to meet those needs leads to heritable
changes in the organ.” Id. at 111.
89
For example, the neo-Lamarckian Robert Chambers thought that “living beings, including man
and society, [were] the products of a gradual and progressive development. Higher forms came into being
because of a small change in a species which was ‘lower’ in the evolutionary chain. This process, guided
by God, was directed at a fixed goal, namely man.” Dassen & Kemperink, supra note 87, at xi.
90
In the early 1920s, many scientists thought that Darwinian natural selection was incompatible
with the emerging science of genetics. At the time of the Scopes trial, a synthesis was just beginning to
emerge. See HARRIS, supra note 88, at 202 (explaining emergence of synthesis).
91
See J. S. WEINER, THE PILTDOWN FORGERY: THE CLASSIC ACCOUNT OF THE MOST FAMOUS AND
SUCCESSFUL HOAX IN SCIENCE 1–16 (reprt. 2009) (describing reception of Piltdown discovery).
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missing link between man and the higher apes. . . .”92 Paleontologist Arthur
Smith Woodward of the British Museum stated that the Piltdown “skull,
representing a hitherto unknown human species, is the missing link[.] I, for
one, have not the slightest doubt . . . . [W]e came direct from a species almost
entirely ape.”93 In a debate with Bryan three years before the Scopes Trial,
Henry Fairfield Osborne, the President of the American Museum of Natural
History, relied on the discovery to refute Bryan’s claim that evolutionary
theory was unproved.94
It should come as no surprise, then, that when Darrow submitted
affidavits of leading scientists to the Scopes court in support of evolutionary
theory, some of them relied heavily on the Piltdown discovery.95 There was
only one problem: years later, investigators revealed that the Piltdown Man
was a crude fake, produced by burying together a human skull, the jaw of an
orangutan, and chimpanzee teeth.96 When it came to Piltdown, it turned out
to be conservative Christians who asked the skeptical questions and much
of the scientific establishment that was guilty of ingenuous faith.
If Darrow’s claim to speak for science was exaggerated, so too was the
assertion that Bryan was the voice of mindless biblical literalism. No doubt,
Bryan believed biblical accounts of miracles that cannot be explained by
modern science,97 but at a crucial stage of Darrow’s examination, he
conceded that at least some biblical passages should be read figuratively98
and even managed to joke about biblical literalism.99 At many other points
in the examination, he commendably refused to express an opinion without
studying the matter in greater detail.100
On a broader level, much of Bryan’s opposition to evolution was
political rather than theological. Of course, his Christian faith was important
to him, but he was never a “fundamentalist” in the modern sense of the word.
92
See Charles Dawson & A. S. Woodward, On the Discovery of a Palæolithic Human Skull and
Mandible in a Flint-Bearing Gravel Overlying the Wealden (Hastings Beds) at Piltdown, Fletching,
Sussex, 69 Q.J. GEOLOGICAL SOC’Y LONDON 117, 149 (1913) (quoting Dawkins).
93
See Man Had Reason Before He Spoke, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1912 (quoting Woodward).
94
LARSON, supra note 3, at 26, 31.
95
See TENNESSEE EVOLUTION CASE, supra note 86, at 237 (showing statement of Dr. Fay Cooper
Cole); id. at 278 (showing statement of Prof. Horatio H. Newman).
96
For an account of the unravelling of the hoax, see WEINER, supra note 91, at 37–49.
97
See, e.g., TENNESSEE EVOLUTION CASE, supra note 86, at 285 (“It is hard to believe for you, but
easy for me. A miracle is a thing performed beyond what a man can perform. When you get beyond what
man can do, you get within the realm of miracles; and it is just as easy to believe the miracle of Jonah as
any other miracle in the Bible.”).
98
Asked by Darrow about a suggestion in the Bible that the sun revolved around the earth, Bryan
replied, “I believe [the Bible] was inspired by the Almighty, and He may have used language that could
be understood at that time.” Id. at 286. Later in the examination, when queried about whether God had
created the earth in six days, Bryan acknowledged that “days” did not mean literal, twenty-four-hour
days. Id. at 302.
99
When Darrow asked whether he believed that “all the living things that were not contained in
[Noah’s Ark] were destroyed,” Bryan replied, “I think that the fish may have lived.” Id. at 289.
100
See, e.g., id. at 292–93 (refusing to offer opinions about matters as to which he was not expert).

2021]

POPULISM AND PROGRESSIVISM

429

His religion was instrumental. Christianity was important because he saw it
as supporting the political commitments that had shaped his adult life: the
insistence on individual dignity and on the necessity of taking seriously the
needs and beliefs of ordinary people.101 For Bryan, mechanistic and
deterministic evolutionary theory put these commitments at risk, especially
in an environment where opponents of these commitments were using
“survival of the fittest” to justify laissez faire economics.
A second characterization of the Dayton trial pits Bryan’s
majoritarianism against Darrow’s defense of individual rights. This was the
way that Bryan himself sometimes described the stakes. He repeatedly and
eloquently defended the rights of communities to decide for themselves what
was taught in their own public schools.102 On the other side, it was also the
way that the American Civil Liberties Union, and its representative in
Dayton, Arthur Garfield Hays, saw the case. According to this
characterization, John Scopes represented free thought, inquiry, and
expression—the freedom to resist majority pressure in the name of
individual autonomy.103 On this view, it was Darrow, rather than Bryan, who
was the supporter of dignity and freedom.
For both sides, this characterization had the advantage of bracketing
explosive issues about the truth of evolutionary theory on the one hand and
of biblical accounts on the other. Bryan could claim that, whatever one made
of the Bible’s creation story, communities had the right to decide for
themselves what their children should be taught. Similarly, Hays could argue
that the right of self-expression should not be held hostage to majority
beliefs whether or not those beliefs were accurate.
But this characterization also fit awkwardly with the positions taken by
each side. There is no doubt that Bryan’s majoritarianism was sincere, but
there is good reason to doubt that it provided his primary motivation. If the
shoe were on the other foot, it is hard to imagine that he would have traveled
hundreds of miles and spent weeks in unbearable summer heat to defend
the right of a popularly elected school board to mandate the teaching of
evolutionary theory.

101
For a sympathetic account of Bryan that strongly emphasizes these points, see KAZIN, A GODLY
HERO, supra note 1, at 262–65.
102
In Dayton, Bryan proclaimed that “[t]he real issue is not what can be taught in public schools,
but who shall control the education system.” LARSON, supra note 3, at 104. See also WILLIAM JENNINGS
BRYAN, ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY VERSUS MODERNISM 45–46 (1923) (“[Teachers in public schools]
have no right to demand pay for teaching that which the parents and the taxpayers do not want taught.
The hand that writes the pay check rules the school.”). For discussion, see Edward J. Larson, The Scopes
Trial and the Evolving Concept of Freedom, 85 VA. L. REV. 503, 510–11 (1999).
103
In a contemporaneous explanation of the stakes of the Scopes trial, the ACLU envisioned it as
presenting “a clear legal test of the right of a majority acting through the legislature to determine what
shall or shall not be taught in public school” and of “the tyranny over minority and unpopular views.”
WEINRIB, supra note 69, at 157–58 (internal quotation marks omitted). On the ACLU’s more general
embrace of academic freedom as a means of protecting radical speech, see id. at 151–57.
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Hays’s individual rights stance provides an even more procrustean fit with
the ACLU’s actual position. It is deeply implausible that opponents of the
Tennessee statute really believed that individual school teachers had the right
to teach whatever they wanted to school children. No one claimed that a school
board had to permit teachers to tell their students that mathematics was the
work of the devil or that totalitarianism is the best form of government.104
If the standard accounts of the Dayton confrontation are wrong, then
what was it that generated the undeniable emotion that accompanied the
trial? The real stakes are dramatically illustrated by the emotional climax of
Darrow’s cross examination of Bryan:
The Witness [Bryan]: These gentlemen . . . did not come here
to try this case. They came here to try revealed religion. I am
here to defend it, and they can ask me any question they please.
The Court: All right.
(Applause from the court yard.)
Mr. Darrow: Great applause from the bleachers.
The Witness: From those whom you call "yokels."
Mr. Darrow: I have never called them yokels.
The Witness: That is the ignorance of Tennessee, the bigotry.
Mr. Darrow: You mean who are applauding you?
(Applause.)
The Witness: Those are the people whom you insult.
Mr. Darrow: You insult every man of science and learning in
the world because he does not believe in your fool religion.105
As this exchange illustrates, the real dispute was not about majority rule
or scientific rationalism. It was about the conflict between progressive and
populist versions of civil liberties. Both scientific rationalism and majority
rule had something to do with the argument, but only in an indirect fashion.
104
When antievolutionists began to lose the culture war, they started to cloak their argument in the
very individual rights claims that Hays and the ACLU had made earlier. Why not present both sides and
give teachers and students the intellectual freedom to decide the controversy for themselves, they argued.
LARSON, supra note 3, at 258. In response to this argument, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana adopted
statutes that mandated some form of “balanced treatment” between Darwinian theory and creationism.
Id. at 258–59. When the Supreme Court finally entered the fray, the Justices instead bought the argument
advanced by the ACLU, see Brief of Appellees at 4, Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1986) (No. 851513), that public schools could not ban the teaching of Darwinian theory, see Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968), and must ban the teaching of creationism even if coupled with the teaching of
Darwinian theory. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). It turned out that the ACLU’s “civil
liberties” position was not about freedom of speech at all but about the primacy of evolutionary theory.
105
TENNESSEE EVOLUTION CASE, supra note 86, at 288.
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For progressives, “civil liberties” were about protecting government from
the influence of a biased and ignorant populace and its “fool religion.”
Scientific rationalism related to this claim, but only because it was part of
the belief system of elites. For populists, collective self-determination was
not ultimately about government power, but about shielding powerless
“ordinary” people from elite denigration—from being labeled as “yokels.”
Majoritarianism related to this claim, but only because it was sometimes
instrumentally useful in providing this shield.
In order to see the way in which the dispute played out and its connection
to modern constitutional debate, we need to compare the Dayton trial with a
second, less famous dispute that reached the Supreme Court two years later.
B. Preventing the Unfit from Continuing Their Kind
A few months before the Dayton trial, another trial court convened to
adjudicate another test case in another southern, rural community—in this
case, Amherst County, Virginia.106 Although there was none of the hoopla
or press coverage that marked the Bryan-Darrow confrontation, the trial in
Amherst County was also mostly for show. Counsel for the respondent was
a long-time friend and supporter of the petitioner and put up only token
opposition to the petitioner’s case.107 The result was again a foregone
conclusion, and, as in Dayton, the purpose of the trial was to establish a
broader point only tangentially related to the personal interests of the
participants. But whereas the personal stakes for John Scopes were
negligible, the stakes for Carrie Buck—the eighteen-year-old Amherst
County respondent—were huge. Her loss, ultimately ratified in a notorious
opinion written by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. for the United States
Supreme Court,108 resulted in compelled surgery that permanently deprived
her of the ability to give birth.
The Amherst County trial grew out of a eugenics craze that engulfed the
country in the early twentieth century.109 At the height of the craze, Virginia
enacted a statute that permitted the forced sterilization of individuals found
to be “afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity that are recurrent, idiocy,
imbecility, feeble-mindedness or epilepsy.”110 By 1931, twenty-eight states
had enacted similar statutes authorizing eugenic sterilization,111 and, as we
shall see, laws along these lines had been endorsed by the leading jurists in
the United States.112
106

For accounts, see COHEN, supra note 4, at 93–97; LOMBARDO, supra note 4, at x–xi.
COHEN, supra note 4, at 98–99; LOMBARDO, supra note 4, at 74.
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Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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See THOMAS C. LEONARD, ILLIBERAL REFORMERS: RACE, EUGENICS & AMERICAN ECONOMICS IN
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 109–28 (2016) (describing eugenics craze); COHEN, supra note 4, at 55–71 (same).
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VA. CODE §§ 1095(h) (1924).
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COHEN, supra note 4, at 300.
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See infra p. 433–34.
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Carrie Buck was an early victim of the craze. She was the descendant of
destitute farmers who had been forced off their land, the sort of people who
might have supported William Jennings Bryan’s presidential campaigns.113
Her mother’s economic difficulties made it hard to care for the child, and
she was taken in by John and Alice Dobbs, who treated her as a servant.114
When she became pregnant as a result of being raped by Alice’s nephew,
the Dobbses filed a petition to commit her to the Virginia Colony for
Epileptics and Feeble-Minded.115 Buck had been a good student, and there
is little or no evidence that she suffered from mental deficiencies.116 Despite
this fact, the judge granted the Dobbses’ petition.117
When the head of the Colony was looking for a test case to establish the
constitutional validity of Virginia’s new eugenics statute, he selected
Buck.118 After she lost at trial and in the United States Supreme Court, she
was involuntarily sterilized119 and, eventually, released from custody.120
People who knew her late in life had no doubt about her intelligence. One
visitor found her “reading the newspaper daily and ‘joining a more literate
friend to assist at regular bouts with the crossword puzzles.’”121 The visitor
reported that Buck was “not a sophisticated woman, and lacked social
graces,” but that “she was neither mentally ill nor retarded.”122
The eugenics fad resulted in personal tragedy for Carrie Buck and for
many others, but for purposes of this Article, two more general facts about
the movement merit attention. First, there was a direct connection between
eugenics and Darwinism.123 Charles Darwin himself understood the
attraction of eugenics. For example, he suggested that sss vaccinations were
113

See COHEN, supra note 4, at 19–20 (describing Buck’s family).
Id. at 20–21.
115
Id. at 16, 24.
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Id. at 17, 21, 24.
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Id. at 27.
118
Apparently, Buck was chosen because of the previous finding of feeblemindedness, the fact that
her mother had been declared a “moron,” the fact that she was an unwed mother, and the fact that she
was young. Id. at 91–92.
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For a description of the surgery, see LOMBARDO, supra note 4, at 185.
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Id. at 284.
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COHEN, supra note 4, at 298.
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Id.
123
The connection was not inevitable. Evolution operates without human intervention. Progressives
therefore might have treated it as allied with a laissez-faire economic and social approach. Eugenics, in
contrast, involved extensive and, by modern lights, extreme government intervention. Cf. Hovenkamp,
supra note 63, at 968 (arguing that conservative “support for eugenics legislation seems inconsistent with
their general embrace of laissez-faire policy”).
There is another sense, though, in which eugenicists and evolutionists were natural allies.
Because evolution is a random process that affected humans, other animals, and plants alike, it suggested
to some that there was nothing special about humans and no intrinsic meaning to their existence. If that
were true, then it might be thought to follow that there was nothing wrong with human intervention in
the evolutionary process. Because intrinsic human dignity was not a concern, there was no reason to
oppose manipulation of the gene pool in order to accomplish the social ends that progressives favored.
Indeed, eugenics might supply meaning that random, undisturbed evolution lacked.
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problematic because they preserved people of “weak constitution.” The
result, he wrote, “must be highly injurious to the race of man.” For Darwin,
though, “the noblest part of our nature” meant that “we must bear without
complaining the undoubtedly bad effects of the weak surviving and
propagating their kind.”124
Many of Darwin’s supporters were uninhibited by these moral reservations.
His half cousin, Francis Galton, coined the word “eugenics” and produced
“scientific” work linking Darwinian insights to a program of promoting “the
more suitable races or strains of blood . . . over the less suitable.”125 Darwin’s
son, Leonard, was the president of the Eugenics Education Society.126
Ronald A. Fisher, perhaps the leading evolutionary biologist in Europe, was
motivated by the desire to prove the worth of eugenics.127
Many evolutionary biologists in the United States held similar views.
Although Darrow himself was a strong opponent of eugenics,128 six of the
experts that he summoned to support him in Dayton had endorsed
eugenics.129 The textbook from which John Scopes taught linked
evolutionary theory to eugenics and endorsed both.130 Scopes made a public
appearance with Charles B. Davenport, one of the country’s leading
eugenicists, who was also a fierce defender of evolutionary biology.131 Harry
Laughlin, a tireless campaigner for eugenic sterilization, held a doctorate in
biology from Princeton.132 Every article on eugenics published in medical
journals between 1899 and 1912 favored sterilization.133
Conversely, much of the opposition to eugenics came from Christian
opponents of Darwinism. Bryan himself opposed evolutionary theory in part
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1 CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN, AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX 162 (1871).
FRANCIS GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 25 n.1 (1883).
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See EUGENICS EDUC. SOC., PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS BY MAJOR LEONARD DARWIN (1911).
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See RONALD AYLMER FISHER, THE GENETICAL THEORY OF NATURAL SELECTION (1930)
(defending eugenics).
128
Darrow characterized eugenics as a “gaudy little plan” designed to impose a “caste system.”
VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR TRIUMPH OF
AMERICAN EUGENICS 15 (2008); see also LEONARD, supra note 109, at 111 n.17 (“Clarence Darrow,
Scopes’s defense lawyer, became an outspoken opponent of eugenics.”).
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LARSON, supra note 3, at 135.
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See GEORGE WILLIAM HUNTER, A CIVIC BIOLOGY: PRESENTED IN PROBLEMS 194–96 (1914)
(endorsing evolution and noting that evolution had culminated in “the highest type of all, the Caucasians,
represented by the civilized white inhabitants of Europe and America”); id. at 261–65 (noting that
“[h]undreds of families [with mental and moral defects] exist to-day, spreading disease, immorality, and
crime to all parts of this country” and that “we . . . have the remedy of separating the sexes in asylums or
other places and in various ways preventing intermarriage and the possibilities of perpetuating such a
low and degenerate race”). After the Scopes trial, the textbook’s author removed the offending material
about evolution but retained and expanded the material about eugenics. LEONARD, supra note 109, at 111.
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See LARSON, supra note3, at 115 (describing appearance).
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COHEN, supra note 4, at 122.
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because it led to eugenic conclusions.134 Billy Sunday, the leading evangelist
of his day, insisted on a similar linkage:
Let your scientific consolation enter a room where the mother
has lost her child. Try your doctrine of the survival of the fittest
. . . And when you have gotten through with your scientific,
philosophical, psychological, eugenic, social service, evolution,
protoplasm and fortuitous concurrence of atoms, if she is not
crazed by it, I will go to her and after one-half hour of prayer
and the reading of the Scripture promises, the tears will be
wiped away.135
The second important fact about the eugenics movement was that it was
largely a progressive project.136 Theodore Roosevelt, the progressive hero of
the Bull Moose campaign, was also the country’s most famous advocate for
eugenics. “[F]eeble-minded persons,” he insisted, should be “forbidden to
leave offspring behind them.”137 While serving as reform governor of New
Jersey, Woodrow Wilson, a strong supporter of eugenics, signed into law a
statute permitting surgery on the “feebleminded (including idiots, imbeciles
and morons), epileptics, rapists, certain criminals and other defectives.”138
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the author of Buck v. Bell and long-time
proponent of eugenics,139 was also a progressive hero, although his
relationship to the movement was complex and ambivalent.140 The same
could not be said of Louis Brandeis, an unabashed progressive,141 or of
Harlan Fiske Stone, who was rapidly moving toward progressive
positions.142 Both joined Holmes’s opinion.
134
See KAZIN, A GODLY HERO, supra note 1, at 263 (explaining Bryan’s views on connection
between eugenics and evolution).
135
LARSON, supra note 3, at 28.
136
See COHEN, supra note 4, at 55 (linking eugenics to progressive reformers); LEONARD, supra
note 109, at 117–19 (same). See generally DONALD K. PICKENS, EUGENICS AND THE PROGRESSIVES
(1968) (same).
137
Victoria Brignell, When America Believed in Eugenics, NEW STATESMAN (Dec. 10, 2010),
https://www.newstatesman.com/society/2010/12/disabled-america-immigration.
138
LOMBARDO, supra note 4, at 26.
139
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1915) (“I believe that the
wholesale social regeneration which so many now seem to expect, if it can be helped by conscious, coordinated human effort, cannot be affected appreciably by tinkering with the institution of property, but
only by taking in hand life and trying to build a race. That would be my starting point for an ideal for the
law.”); Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 254, 282 (1963) (“It
is difficult to overestimate the importance of eugenicism in Holmes’s social thought.”); COHEN, supra
note 4, at 240–42 (detailing Holmes’s long association with the eugenics movement).
140
See G. EDWARD WHITE, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 94–96 (2006) (explaining how “[a]
group of progressive intellectuals” claimed Holmes as a hero).
141
See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 201, 214, 216–17, 220 (2009) (describing
Brandeis’s association with the progressive movement).
142
See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 252–54 (1956)
(describing Stone’s contemporaneous movement toward Brandeis and Holmes in their “battle against
formalistic jurisprudence”).
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More broadly, eugenics fit seamlessly into a progressive program that
emphasized rationality, social hygiene, science, and the seemingly limitless
potential for reform that could be produced by intelligent use of government
power to correct social ills.143 Of course, a strong current of racism and
xenophobia also ran through the eugenics movement. It was no coincidence
that its triumphs came at a time when there was growing panic about
immigration and a change in the country’s ethnic mix.144 But given this fact,
it is all the more striking that eugenics never gained a foothold in the Deep
South. The reason seems to be that progressive elitism was almost entirely a
northern phenomenon. The eugenics movement was populated by white,
middle class, northern, and urban reformers who were also attracted to
progressivism. Where populism reigned, eugenics mostly failed.145
Given this association, it is easy to see why Carrie Buck’s case, like John
Scopes’s, pitted progressive and populist versions of constitutionalism
against each other. Figuring out what was at stake in Buck’s case helps us
see more clearly what was at stake in Dayton and what, precisely, the
difference between populists and progressives amounts to.
The starting point for this inquiry is a comparison between Holmes’s
remarkable opinion and the opinions that he might have written. Holmes
might have written an opinion supporting Carrie Buck’s claim on the ground
that the Constitution protects minority rights. This is the Holmes of his
famous dissent in Abrams v. United States,146 where he warned “that we
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions that we loathe.”147 It is also the way that Arthur Garfield Hays
characterized what was at stake in the Scopes trial.148
Alternatively, Holmes might have ruled in Buck’s favor on the ground
that eugenics was “junk science.” Although many contemporary scientists
supported eugenics, there was enough contemporary dissent to form the
basis for doubt.149 In Dayton, Darrow argued against the unthinking
143
See SOUTHERN, supra note 24, at 50 (“Eugenics appealed to tough-minded progressives because
it was reformist, involved the use of government, and was, seemingly, based on cutting-edge science.”);
David E. Bernstein & Thomas C. Leonard, Excluding Unfit Workers: Social Control Versus Social
Justice in the Age of Economic Reform, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 179–80 (2009) (associating
progressive elitism with belief in social control through judgments of hereditary fitness); PICKENS, supra
note 136, at 4 (associating eugenics with progressive faith in science and worries about democracy).
144
See LEONARD, supra note 109, at 148 (discussing the Progressive Era anti-immigration
campaign and its ties to eugenics).
145
See generally EDWARD J. LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE DEEP SOUTH
(1995) (noting the contrast between the populist and progressive movement as it relates to eugenics). But
cf. LEONARD, supra note 144, at 115 (“The appeal of eugenics crossed ideological boundaries . . . .”).
146
250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
147
Id. at 630.
148
See supra p. 429 (discussing Hays’s argument that “the right of self-expression should not be
held hostage to majority beliefs”).
149
See Hovenkamp, supra note 63, at 971 (noting that by the time Buck was decided “compulsory
sterilization legislation was already the target of considerable scientific doubt”); COHEN, supra note 4, at
252–54 (detailing growing opposition to eugenics at the time when Buck was decided).
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acceptance of received wisdom.150 The Holmes of Abrams warned that “time
has upset many fighting faiths.”151 The Holmes of Buck might have directed
some of his famous skepticism against the state’s case.
Finally, if Holmes was determined to rule against Buck, he might have
done so on majoritarian grounds. This stance would have aligned him with
Bryan’s assertion in Dayton that, whether or not biblical creation accounts
were accurate, the people had the right to decide for themselves that they
wished to embrace it.152 This was also the Holmes of Lochner v. New York,153
when he confronted the economic version of Darwinian theory. In that
context, he wrote that:
If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should
desire to study it further and long before making up my mind.
But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly
believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do
with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law.154
Of course, Holmes wrote none of these opinions. After a brief and
perfunctory obeisance toward the principle of judicial deference,155 he wrote
the following:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it
could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the
State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those
concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with
incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting
to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve
for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly
unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains
compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the
Fallopian tubes. . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough.156
This is not the language of skepticism, of deference to majority
judgments, or of civil liberties. It is a full-throated defense, on the merits, of
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the eugenics program.157 That defense is consistent with broad strands in the
progressive tradition that celebrated public policy produced by
unsentimental, rational, and clear-eyed balancing of costs and benefits. This
posture leads naturally to a readiness to override supposed individual rights
in order to achieve the public good. It also lends itself to an ingenuous
acceptance of scientific expertise.
At first, though, Holmes’s rhetoric seems irreconcilable with the civil
liberties position that Arthur Garfield Hays advanced in Dayton, just as the
progressive defense of civil liberties more generally seems inconsistent with
progressive faith in government power. In fact, the two positions can be
reconciled, but only in a way that is deeply unsettling.
The reconciliation cannot be achieved by reference to constitutionally
imposed neutrality between competing community norms—that is, in the way
that many modern liberals claim.158 As I have already argued, it is very
doubtful that the ACLU really favored a freedom of conscience that permitted
school teachers to teach children whatever the teachers happened to believe.
The ACLU was in favor of science, not freedom of conscience. Similarly,
there was nothing “neutral” or respectful toward competing communities in
Holmes’s endorsement of eugenics. On the contrary, eugenics threatened the
very existence of communities that made progressives uncomfortable.159 Like
evolutionary theory, eugenics was attractive to progressives because it was
“scientific” and rationalistic, and, therefore, in accord with the values of the
particular community to which progressives belonged.160
A reconciliation between progressive support for civil liberties and
progressive belief in government power is possible only because of the
persistent progressive tendency to confuse progressive value judgments with
neutral and universal truths.161 On this reconciliation, what civil liberties
actually amounted to was not immunity for individual conscience, but immunity
for government when it is threatened by unreasoned and biased mass opinions.
To understand how far progressives were willing to go in order to enforce
that immunity, we need to grasp the scope of the eugenics project that Buck v.
Bell endorsed. A report funded by the Carnegie Institution suggested
euthanasia as a method of dealing with disabled individuals.162 Harry
157
Cf. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 534 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that Buck v.
Bell “was not grudging in sustaining the constitutionality of the once-pervasive practice of involuntarily
sterilizing those with mental disabilities”).
158
Cf. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 603 (1990)
(advocating government neutrality between competing norms).
159
See infra p. 456–57.
160
PICKENS, supra note 136, at 4.
161
Id. (“[E]ugenists [sic] appeared as progressives in their use of ‘science’ in reform matters, and
yet, worried about the growth of democracy in an urban and industrial America, they merely projected
their class prejudices as objective laws of civilization and nature.”).
162
See BLEEKER VAN WAGENEN, EUGENICS EDUC. SOC’Y, PROBLEMS IN EUGENICS. PAPERS
COMMUNICATED TO THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL EUGENICS CONGRESS HELD AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
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Laughlin, the head of the Eugenics Record Office and a leading spokesman
for the movement, wrote that “[t]he lowest ten percent of the human stock are
so meagerly endowed by Nature that their perpetuation would constitute a
social menace.”163 Intelligence tests administered to newly arrived immigrants
in 1913 “found that 79 percent of Italians, 80 percent of Hungarians, 83
percent of Jews, and 87 percent of Russians were feebleminded.”164 Tests
administered to 1.75 million Army enlistees in 1917 found feeblemindedness
in 47.3% of white test takers.165 One leading eugenicist thought that it might
be necessary to sterilize some fifteen million people.166
In light of all this, it is easy to see why William Jennings Bryan thought
that eugenics and the evolutionary theory that buttressed it were an
existential threat. The eugenics project was nothing less than an attempt to
extirpate the portion of the population most likely to be his supporters. The
reasonableness of that fear, in turn, dissolves the tension between Bryan’s
support for majoritarianism during the Scopes trial and, had he lived, what
undoubtedly would have been his support for individual rights in the Buck
case. The thread that connects the two positions is not a concern for either
majoritarianism or individual rights as we understand these concepts today,
but rather a concern that “ordinary people” in general will be belittled,
subjugated, and, ultimately, eliminated by an arrogant and heartless elite.
To summarize, both the progressive and populist stances in Scopes and
Buck are internally consistent if one focuses on the right question. True,
progressives favored individual liberties in Scopes, but not Buck and populists
opposed majoritarianism in Buck, but not Scopes. But this seeming
inconsistency dissolves once one understands that neither individual liberties
nor majoritarianism was what the participants thought was at stake in the two
cases. Instead, the real issue was protection of “ordinary people” from elite
denigration on the one hand and protection of government from mass
ignorance on the other. For populists, defense of Tennessee’s anti-evolution
law and of Carrie Buck’s right to have children were both efforts to shield
average citizens from elite denigration. For progressives, defense of Virginia’s
eugenics law and of John Scopes’s right to teach Darwinian theory were both
efforts to avoid pollution of government by mass ignorance.
Seeing how this conflict played out is the work of the next two Parts.
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III. WHAT CAME NEXT
A. Eugenics
Buck v. Bell has never been overruled, and the Supreme Court continued
to cite it into the twenty-first century.167 America’s love affair with eugenics
continued as well. Polls in the late 1930s found that 84% of Americans
favored sterilization of “habitual criminals and the hopelessly insane.”168 In
1974, a federal judge found “uncontroverted evidence” that in the recent past
“minors and other incompetents have been sterilized with federal funds and
that an indefinite number of poor people have been improperly coerced into
accepting a sterilization operation under the threat that various federally
supported welfare benefits would be withdrawn unless they submitted to
irreversible sterilization.”169 In 2010, California was found to have sterilized
large numbers of female prisoners without their full consent.170As late as
2019, a nurse at the Irwin County Ice Detention Center in Georgia filed a
whistle-blower complaint claiming that detainees had told her they had had
their uteruses removed without their full understanding or consent.171
But although support did not die out, cultural and legal developments
reversed the momentum favoring eugenics. The cultural change resulted
from popular revulsion with the Nazi eugenics program.172 A simultaneous
legal change occurred in 1942 when the Supreme Court decided Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson.173 At issue was a state statute providing for
involuntary sterilization of persons who had committed three or more “felonies

167
See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369 n.6 (2001) (noting that eugenicsbased “laws were upheld against constitutional attack 70 years ago in Buck v. Bell”); Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 326 (1973) (Brennan, J., White, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Justice Holmes’s remark that the Equal
Protection Clause “was the last resort of constitutional arguments”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154
(1973) (citing Buck for the proposition that “[t]he Court has refused to recognize an unlimited” scope for
the right of privacy).
168
LOMBARDO, supra note 4, at 227. In contrast, only 70% favored distribution of birth control
information, and 65% favored the death penalty for murder. More than half the respondents favored
“mercy deaths” for “hopeless invalids.” Id.
169
Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974).
170
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Eugenics and Mass Incarceration, 68 DUKE L.J. 417, 461 (2018) (noting the legacy of Buck v. Bell in
California’s forced sterilization of female prisoners). For efforts to trace modern hyper-incarceration to
roots in the eugenics movement, see id. and James C. Oleson, The New Eugenics: Black HyperIncarceration and Human Abatement, 5 SOC. SCIS. 1, 1–2, 5 (2016).
171
See Caitlin Dickerson, Seth Freed Wessler & Miriam Jordon, Immigrants Say They Were
Pressured into Unneeded Surgeries, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/2
9/us/ice-hysterectomies-surgeries-georgia.html.
172
There is evidence that the Nazis used the American genetics program as a model, and Nazis on trial
in Nuremberg cited Buck in defense of their actions. COHEN, supra note 4, at 11. By the late 1930s, however,
the German regime had begun to characterize America as populated by “weaker white ‘races,’” thereby
helping to discredit “scientific” racism and, with it, the eugenic project. NOURSE, supra note 128, at 15.
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involving moral turpitude.”174 Justice Douglas’s opinion for the majority cited
Buck several times and purported to leave its holding intact.175 It nonetheless
found that the Oklahoma statute violated the Equal Protection Clause because
it excepted from its coverage “offenses arising out of the violation of the
prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses.”176
The first paragraph of Justice Douglas’s opinion, apparently added late
in the drafting process,177 invoked neither the populist nor the progressive
tradition. Instead it used the rhetoric of individual rights. Douglas wrote,
“[t]his case touches a sensitive and important area of human rights.
Oklahoma deprives certain individuals of a right which is basic to the
perpetuation of a race–the right to have offspring.”178
But here, as in Scopes and Buck, we should not be misled by individual
rights rhetoric. If the “important” “right to have offspring” really had
constitutional stature, then Buck would have been overruled or, at least, sharply
limited, and there would have been no need to resort to equal protection analysis.
To understand what actually drove the outcome, we need to view the
case through the prism of populist and progressive constitutionalism. It turns
out that whereas populists and progressives disagreed in Scopes and Buck,
they could join in an overlapping consensus in Skinner.
From the progressive point of view, an important change occurred
between 1927 and 1942. In large part because of the Nazis’ brutal
experiment with eugenics, elite opinion had changed sides.179 Although
eugenics remained popular among the populace as a whole, experts
increasingly doubted eugenic claims.180 Academics now saw the program as
thinly disguised racism based on myth and pseudo-science in much the
way that experts had denigrated biblical creation stories fifteen years
earlier in Dayton.181
There are hints throughout the Skinner litigation that the Justices were
influenced by this shift. At oral argument, Chief Justice Stone asked
skeptical questions about whether criminal traits were subject to genetic
transmission,182 and Justice Jackson asked whether environment, rather than
genetics, produced crime.183 When Douglas came to write his opinion, he
bracketed the argument that the Oklahoma statute “cannot be sustained as
an exercise of the police power, in view of the state of scientific authorities
174
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respecting inheritability of criminal traits,”184 but he nonetheless took the
trouble to cite five studies suggesting that the eugenics argument was deeply
flawed.185 And when he turned to the Equal Protection analysis, he mocked
Oklahoma’s claim that there was scientific evidence supporting the notion
that chicken thieves, but not embezzlers, had a genetic propensity to
crime.186 Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion expressed doubt about the
effort “to sterilize the individual in pursuit of a eugenic plan to eliminate
from the race characteristics that are only vaguely identified and which in
our present state of knowledge are uncertain as to transmissibility.”187 Chief
Justice Stone based his concurrence on the failure of the state to provide a
hearing to discover whether “[the defendant’s] criminal tendencies are of an
inheritable type.”188
In light of this shift in expert opinion, the progressive stance in Scopes,
Buck, and Skinner is entirely consistent. In each case, progressives treated
the Constitution as shielding government from corruption produced by
ignorant and prejudiced mass opinion. The fact that elite opinion about
eugenics changed between Buck and Skinner might have given more
perceptive progressives pause about their ingenuous faith in expertise. But
because that faith remained unshaken, progressives were willing to change
their views to conform to a shift in the scientific consensus.189 Because that
consensus now condemned eugenics, preservation of government as the
domain of experts now required courts to condemn it as well.
That condemnation, standing alone, might have led to the outright
overruling of Buck. But by preserving Buck and shifting to an equal
protection theory, Justice Douglas was able to make a second point, also in
tension with an individual rights approach, but this time appealing to
populists. For populists, the shift from the substantive due process emphasis
in Buck to an equal protection rationale served to emphasize the class bias
inherent in the eugenics project. No doubt because of the Nazi experience,
Douglas mentioned race and nationality rather than class. Still, the statutory
distinctions that he emphasized—between chicken thieves on the one hand
and embezzlers and corrupt politicians on the other—made the point about
class distinctions clearly enough. “[S]trict scrutiny,” he wrote, was
necessary “lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are
made against groups or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional
guaranty of just and equal laws.”190 For populists, this language could easily
184
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be read as endorsing the proposition that the lifestyles, customs, and beliefs
of “ordinary Americans” were not sources of shame and should not be the
target of derision and condescension. They were certainly not a cancer to be
removed from the American body politic. Instead, they were sources of pride
to be valued and respected. Of course, and above all, that was the point that
Bryan wanted to make in Dayton and, indeed, throughout his public life.
B. Orthodoxy in Education
Just as Skinner required a reinterpretation of Buck, the Court’s decision
a year later in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette191 required
a reinterpretation of Scopes. But whereas Skinner produced a
populist/progressive détente, Barnette demonstrated that the conflict could
not be resolved permanently.
At issue was a school district’s expulsion of children who adhered to the
Jehovah’s Witness faith for refusal to participate in a flag salute
ceremony.192 In Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 193 the Court had
rejected a free exercise challenge to expulsions with only one dissent. A
scant three years later, it reversed itself and endorsed a free speech challenge
to a similar measure in Barnette.194
Justice Jackson’s opinion is famous for his powerful endorsement of
individual rights, and Justice Frankfurter’s lengthy and sprawling dissent
rings all the changes of majoritarianism and judicial restraint. Once again,
though, one needs to look beneath the surface to find the issues that actually
divide the justices.
Consider, first, the Jackson opinion. In its most famous passages,
Jackson proclaims that “[o]ne’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental
rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections”195 and that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”196
This is strong rhetoric, but it presents two difficulties. First, the rhetoric
conflicts with the more general progressive position on government power.
Jackson himself said as much. He conceded that the principles he relied on
“grew in soil which also produced a philosophy that the individual was the
center of society, that his liberty was attainable through mere absence of
governmental restraints, and that government should be entrusted with few

191

319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Id. at 629–30.
193
310 U.S. 586 (1940).
194
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
195
Id. at 638.
196
Id. at 642.
192

2021]

POPULISM AND PROGRESSIVISM

443

controls and only the mildest supervision over men’s affairs.”197 On
Jackson’s account, this “laissez-faire concept or principle of noninterference has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social
advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of society
and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls.”198
These musings amount to a remarkably (and, in Jackson’s case,
characteristically) candid acknowledgement of progressive confusion over
civil liberties. Why should progressives, who trust government power
everywhere else, worry about it in this context?
The confusion is especially pronounced because Barnette dealt with
school children, where doubts about whether “liberty [is] attainable through
mere absence of governmental restraints” are most intense.199 Jackson must
have understood that withdrawing government compulsion did not leave the
children free to decide for themselves whether to salute the flag. As Justice
Frankfurter wrote in Gobitis, the pledge might serve “to awaken in the child’s
mind considerations as to the significance of the flag contrary to those implanted
by the parent.”200 Viewed from this angle, it is easy to see the progressive
point that state compulsion sometimes promotes freedom of thought, as
when, for example, it dissipates the effect of parental indoctrination.201
This point, in turn, leads to a second problem. Whatever the merits of
Jackson’s eloquent attack on compelled orthodoxy in other contexts, it is hard
to reconcile with the way that public education actually functions. Public
education is shot through with compelled orthodoxy. Indeed, the transmission
of a unifying body of common knowledge and belief is the central aim of the
enterprise.202 Children who write essays defending white supremacy in their
civics classes or insist on the Ptolemaic system in their science classes do not
tend to get good grades.203 Jackson writes that “[f]ree public education, if
197
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faithful to the ideal of secular instruction and political neutrality, will not be
partisan or enemy of any class, creed, party, or faction.”204 But Jackson could
only make this assertion by wrongly associating secularism with “political
neutrality” and his own contestable beliefs with nonpartisanship. That
conflation is incompatible with the very intellectual freedom that the opinion
celebrates, but it is fully consistent with progressive elitism.
For these reasons, Barnette fits awkwardly within the individual rights
canon. To understand what the opinion is really about, one must know
something about the events that transpired between the Court’s original
decision upholding compelled flag salutes and its ultimate decision
invalidating the practice.
As Vincent Blasi and Seana Shiffrin detail in their riveting account, in
the immediate wake of Gobitis, there were hundreds of violent attacks on
Jehovah’s Witnesses.205 In one incident, Witnesses were “forced . . . to drink
large quantities of castor oil, roped . . . together, then paraded . . . through
the town.”206 In a Wyoming incident, a Witness was tarred and feathered.207
In still another incident, “vigilantes pulled [a] Witness . . . from his car,
draped a flag over the hood, and when he refused their demand that he salute
the flag, slammed his head against the hood for nearly thirty minutes as the
chief of police looked on.”208 Altogether, in 1940, there were attacks against
almost 1,500 Witnesses in 335 incidents in forty-four states.209 Over 2,000
Witness children in forty-eight states were expelled from school for refusal
to salute the flag.210
Barnette does not explicitly mention any of these events, but there is no
doubt that the Justices were aware of them. According to Shawn Francis
Peters, Jackson’s original draft referred to the post-Gobitis violence, but
Chief Justice Stone warned Jackson that the allusions might promote “the
impression that our judgment of the legal question was affected by the
disorders.”211 At Stone’s strong urging, Jackson removed the direct
references.212 Instead he made his point inferentially by detailing “the Roman
drive to stamp out Christianity . . . the Inquisition . . . the Siberian exiles . . .
down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies.”213
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Jackson’s concern was rooted in progressive fears about populism
unchained. The fear was not solely about government impingement on
individual rights. After all, Jackson was an opponent of the view that “liberty
was attainable through mere absence of governmental restraints” or “that
government should be entrusted with few controls and only the mildest
supervision over men’s affairs.”214 The fear was about private, rather than
public, power. It was that Jehovah’s Witnesses, a small and powerless group,
were being victimized by popular hatred and prejudice. A paroxysm of mass
violence required active government intervention, not the acquiescence in
private arrangements that traditional civil liberties entails. For Jackson, the
government intervention took the form of invalidating legislation that
fueled the violence.
The concern was reinforced by elite disdain for empty, symbolic ritual.
Jackson was willing to tolerate flag salute ceremonies designed to promote
nationalism when they were purely “voluntary.” He nonetheless wrote that
the ceremonies were “a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas.
. . . a short cut from mind to mind.”215 This “short cut” was no substitute for
the hard intellectual work necessary to reach the kinds of conclusions that
merited respect. True national unity was the product of “persuasion and
example,”216 not compelled ritual. Jackson was confident “of the appeal of
our institutions to free minds” and protective of “intellectual individualism
and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional minds.”217
This rhetoric fits uncomfortably with the Witness’s actual objections to
the flag salute, based as they were on religious faith rather than in secular,
intellectual analysis. But it is hardly a surprise that progressive justices
would use arguments like this to support their position. The arguments are
rooted in a commitment to voluntarism, rationality, and Enlightenment
values. They implicitly discount the roles of history, culture, habit, ritual,
and indoctrination as sources of value and methods by which values are
transmitted. Put differently, as populists undoubtedly would have pointed
out, the arguments are deeply hostile to the ways in which many Americans
come to their views.
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Roberts and Reed, dissented in
Barnette, but his opinion was hardly a defense of populism. Instead, the
argument between the dissent and the majority amounted to an intramural
quarrel between progressives. Frankfurter did not defend mass opinion,
much less mass violence. As “[o]ne who belongs to the most vilified and
persecuted minority in history,”218 he hardly could. As a personal matter he
“whole-heartedly associate[d] [himself] with the general libertarian views in
214
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the Court’s opinion, representing as they do the thought and action of a
lifetime.”219 But for Frankfurter, the lesson to be drawn from the progressive
triumph that he helped bring about was that judges should generally abstain
from interferences with the political branches which could, on the whole, be
trusted to produce wise and humane public policy. In a passage that directly
tied the flag salute controversy to the earlier dispute in Dayton, he asked:
[I]s this Court to enter the old controversy between science and
religion by unduly defining the limits within which a state may
experiment with its school curricula? The religious consciences
of some parents may be offended by subjecting their children to
the Biblical account of creation, while another state may offend
parents by prohibiting a teaching of biology that contradicts
such Biblical account. Compare Scopes v. State . . . .220
Of course, self-restraint of this sort depends on faith that government
institutions will be mostly a force for good even if they occasionally adopt
retrograde policies. But as a lifelong progressive, Frankfurter understood
that a failure of this faith doomed the progressive platform as a whole. He
was prepared to resolve progressive confusion over civil liberties by an
unambiguous embrace of government power. Accordingly, he warned that
the majority’s support for freedom of speech and religion might also support
“[t]he right not to have property taken without just compensation”221—a right
that had notoriously stood in the way of progressive reforms. For him, the
proper analogies were not to the Roman suppression of Christianity or the
Inquisition. Instead, like Holmes in Buck, Frankfurter invoked standard
progressive programs for public betterment like “[c]ompulsory vaccination”
and “food inspection regulations.”222 And in a chilling, if perhaps
unintentional, reminder of Buck, he added “compulsory medical treatment”
to his list.223
On this reading, then, both Jackson’s and Frankfurter’s opinions
defended progressivism against populist rivals. For Jackson, that defense
meant standing up to mass pressure and unregulated private violence that
threatened sensible, unbiased government institutions like the public
schools. For Frankfurter, it meant defending government against claims of
individual rights.
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Channeling James Madison,224 Jackson warned that “small and local
authorit[ies]” might be more susceptible to mass pressure.225 Frankfurter
might have responded by celebrating local, direct democracy, as populists
and anti-Federalists before them often did. Instead, he made the opposite
point, emphasizing that “[t]he flag salute requirement . . . comes before us
with the full authority of the State of West Virginia. . . . To suggest that we
are here concerned with the heedless action of some village tyrants is to
distort the augustness of the constitutional issue . . . .”226
No one on the Court suggested that “some village” might be the best
venue for determining school policy, that citizens of such a village might
feel legitimately threatened by challenges to the sacred ceremonies that
defined their culture, or that their school curricula might be rooted in
something other than the “ideal of secular instruction and political
neutrality.”227 The silence proved to be ominous, but its consequences were
delayed by a mid-century flowering of progressive constitutionalism.
IV. THE WARREN COURT AND ITS AFTERMATH
One can draw a direct line from Skinner and Barnette to much of the
Warren Court’s work. Relying on Skinner’s invocation of “strict scrutiny,”
the Warren Court subjected racial classifications and classifications
impinging on a “fundamental interest” to heightened review.228 Relying on
Skinner’s invocation of reproductive rights, the Warren Court began an
inquiry229 that culminated in Roe v. Wade.230 Barnette’s emphasis on
secularism and rationality in public education led to the banning of prayers
in public schools,231 limits on the funding for parochial schools,232
invalidating a prohibition on the teaching of evolution in public schools233
and the outlawing of school segregation.234 Justice Jackson’s concern that
populist hysteria might destroy establishment institutions led the Warren
224
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Court to oppose McCarthyism.235 Barnette’s embrace of free inquiry led to
the Warren Court’s free speech activism,236 including its defense of
academic freedom237 and of erotic literature.238
Of course, it is a mistake to abstract from the various social and political
forces that produced Warren Court progressivism. There was nothing
automatic or mechanical about the movement from Barnette and Skinner to
the reformist judicial activism of the 1950s and 1960s. The connection is
nonetheless worth emphasizing because it sheds a different and revealing
light on the Warren Court experience.
In his famous synthesis, John Hart Ely argued that the Warren Court
could best be understood as “reinforcing” democratic processes. 239 In his
view, most of the Court’s work did not rest on contestable substantive value
judgments. Instead, the Court was in the business of ensuring fair
representation by preventing political insiders from locking out their
opponents and by protecting “discrete and insular minorities” from the
prejudice that blocked their full political participation.240
The Court’s free speech, voting rights, and reapportionment decisions
were prime examples of the first effort.241 Its campaign against racial
discrimination exemplified the second effort.242 On Ely’s account, the pivot
point in the Court’s history comes with footnote four of Carolene
Products243 and the Court’s reconciliation of liberal judicial activism with
anti-Lochnerism.244
No doubt, there is something to this account, but the account also misses
something important that studying the progressive-populist split reveals. In a
less well-known but equally brilliant synthesis,245 Lucas A. Powe points out
the extent to which Warren Court activism rested on two very different pillars:
an effort to bring rural and southern America into the mainstream northern,
suburban, and urban political culture,246 and an unbridled faith in the power of
government-led reform.247 Although Powe himself does not put it this way,
both pillars illustrate the victory of progressive over populist constitutionalism.
235
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They provide a way to understand constitutional conflicts if one focuses on
Scopes and Buck instead of on Lochner and Carolene Products.
The first effort is illustrated by the reapportionment decisions. It is easy
to see why Ely treated the cases as grounded in support for democratic
processes, but as Justice Frankfurter, among others, pointed out,248
democratic theory is open-textured and contested. The Court’s rejection of
a statewide referendum mandating a malapportioned upper house249—the
kind of direct, popular democracy that populists favored—was certainly not
required by uncontroversial tenets of democratic theory. Nor would it be
hard to construct a version of the theory that treated rural voters as a “discrete
and insular minority” entitled to institutional protection. What is beyond
dispute, though, is the fact that the reapportionment cases massively shifted
electoral power from the countryside to the emerging urban and suburban
areas.250 As a cultural matter, reapportionment was a triumph for the
educated and cosmopolitan middle and upper classes—the natural
constituency of progressives. Its victims were the already isolated and
downwardly mobile rural voters—the natural constituency of populists.
In still more obvious ways, the Court’s desegregation decisions attacked
what was then thought of as southern exceptionalism. It did not escape the
attention of southern populists that the Court quickly lost its zeal for the integration
process when the battle moved from the rural south to the urban north.251
Despite this fact, no one should deny Ely’s point that prejudice against
racial minorities, as well as more overt denials of the franchise, sharply
limited Black political power. Nor should anyone doubt the Warren Court’s
good faith when it grappled with the problem of racial justice. Still, there
was nothing inevitable about the Court’s proposed solution to this problem.
248
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As Derrick Bell and Gary Peller have powerfully demonstrated, the Black
community was divided between integrationist and Black nationalist
critiques of white racism.252 In a counterfactual world where African
Americans were fairly represented in our political institutions, it is anyone’s
guess who would have won this struggle.
It follows that a Court devoted to representation reinforcement might
have endorsed Black nationalist remedies that would have required massive
public investments in Black communities and institutions. This approach
would have embraced the kind of localism and community power
compatible with a populist world view. Instead, the Court nationalized the
struggle. It effectively mandated the destruction of African American primary
and secondary schools and embraced the progressive view that emphasized
the irrationality of racial differences and the need to assimilate African
Americans into a sensible, meritocratic, and rationalistic white culture.253
The Warren Court’s criminal justice decisions stemmed from similar
impulses. As many have pointed out, the Justices thought of criminal justice
reform as a branch of its racial justice project.254 The target was mostly
southern, racist police forces that used state violence to enforce racial
subjugation. The objective was to “modernize” and “professionalize”
policing by making it more scientific and rational.255 A populist approach
might, instead, have focused on democratizing policing and providing for
direct community involvement and control.
Many Warren Court decisions also illustrate the second of Powe’s two
hallmarks of Warren Court activism: unconstrained optimism about the
possibilities of social transformation through the vigorous and “rational”
application of constitutional law. Justices on the Warren Court appear to
have actually believed that racism could be eradicated by the integration of
public education; that Miranda warnings256 and suppression of illegally
seized evidence257 could eliminate police violence and professionalize law
enforcement; that a speech marketplace that was “robust[] and wideopen”258 would yield sensible public policy; and that disputes about matters

252
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 17 (1987);
GARY PELLER, CRITICAL RACE CONSCIOUSNESS: RECONSIDERING AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES OF RACIAL
JUSTICE 51–55 (2011).
253
See PELLER, supra note 252, at 5–18 (defending the Black nationalist perspective against
integrationist ideology).
254
See, e.g., POWE, JR., supra note 245, at 198, 492 (noting that the Warren Court’s “criminal
procedure cases were thinly disguised race cases”); Burt Neuborne, The Gravitational Pull of Race on
the Warren Court, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 84–87 (exploring connection between race and Warren Court
criminal procedure decisions).
255
POWE, JR., supra note 245, at 199.
256
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
257
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to
the states).
258
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).

2021]

POPULISM AND PROGRESSIVISM

451

like birth control, pornography, and prayer in schools could be settled by
calm study of the empirical evidence.
With the advantage of hindsight, it is now clear that these predictions
were wildly optimistic. For present purposes, though, it is important to
emphasize that they were connected to the general progressive faith in
progress and rationality and rejection of populist fears about elitism and
condescension. The point is obscured by the fact that Warren Court reforms
often involved the invalidation of legislation. If one thinks of progressivism
as emphasizing the power of the political branches, that fact seems
anomalous. If instead, one thinks of progressivism as entailing an effort to
cleanse the political processes of popular prejudice and irrationality that
blocked needed reform, the paradox dissolves.
The Warren Court was liberal, and liberalism is an amalgam of
contradictory progressive and populist impulses. It is therefore unsurprising
that there were also some populist strands in Warren Court jurisprudence.
For example, its efforts to deal with the problem of poverty reflected a
populist sensibility. Decisions that guaranteed the right of poor people to
representation in criminal trials,259 that prohibited jailing of defendants too
poor to pay fines,260 that abolished the poll tax,261 and that protected the
rights of welfare recipients262 all suggested a concern about class-based
exclusion from full citizenship.
It is nonetheless striking that the Warren Court was at its most tentative
when it embraced the class problem. The Court never quite got around to
saying that wealth discrimination was a suspect classification or that there
was a fundamental interest in the means of subsistence. Reforms to protect
the poor and powerless in the criminal justice system were linked to the rise
of waivers that made the reforms more theoretical than real.263 The
possibility of a jury trial was of little value in a world where the vast majority
of cases ended in a plea bargain.264
When the conservative counterrevolution began, the left-populist strands
of Warren Court activism were among the first to be disowned. The
259
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed
indigent criminal defendants the right to appointed counsel).
260
See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibited the imprisonment of an indigent defendant for failure to pay a fine).
261
See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding that the poll tax
unconstitutionally infringed on the right to vote).
262
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause prohibited the
termination of welfare benefits prior to a hearing); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding
that states could not impose durational residency requirements on welfare recipients).
263
See, e.g., Michael E. Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term—Foreword: Waiver of
Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1970) (attacking Warren Court’s
readiness to recognize waiver of constitutional rights); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its
History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 39 (1979) (describing pervasiveness of plea bargaining).
264
See Alschuler, supra note 263, at 1 (stating that roughly ninety percent of state and federal
criminal defendants plead guilty rather than go to trial).
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counterrevolution began slowly and tentatively,265 but eventually it picked up
steam and, at this writing, is poised to achieve something like complete victory.
There are many explanations for this shift, ranging from Warren Court
overreaching, to macro-level political and economic changes, to luck in the
timing of Supreme Court vacancies. For purposes of this Article, though, it
is useful to emphasize the connection between the conservative victory and
the internal weaknesses and contradictions in both populist and progressive
approaches to constitutional law. That is the subject of the next Part.
V. WHAT HAPPENED IN KANSAS266
A. Populism’s Conservative Transformation
From the beginning, populism was beset by a fatal contradiction. The
movement was grounded in anger and resentment directed at twin evils:
economic injustice and cultural denigration. It turned out, though, that
remedies for the two evils looked in opposite directions. On occasion,
populists favored strong government action to remedy the first evil—for
example, vigorous antitrust enforcement or nationalization of some major
industries—to fight their wealthy oppressors. But many populists also
believed that the government was in the hands of forces that had no sympathy
for their deepest beliefs and aspirations. This cultural disconnect contributed
to a sense that government could not be trusted. Legislators and judges had
sold out to the rich and powerful, and government collusion with the railroads
and producers had driven down the incomes of ordinary people.267 But if
government was the enemy, then how could it also be the solution?
The contradiction might have been resolved by popular democracy. The
first step was for an aroused citizenry to take direct control of government.
Once the takeover had been effectuated, a newly invigorated and
corruption-free state could marshal government power to protect the people
from predation.268
Unfortunately, this resolution posed a variety of problems of its own.
First, it was always unclear how popular democracy could be put in place.
Certainly, state plutocrats were not about to agree to procedural reforms that
would guarantee their own defeat. Revolutionary Marxists had a solution to
this problem, but populists did not. The very pervasiveness of the corruption
that populists decried made implausible the popular democracy solution that
they proposed.
265
See generally THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T (Vincent Blasi
ed., 1983) (arguing that the Burger Court did little to reverse Warren Court initiatives).
266
Cf. THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS: HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE
HEART OF AMERICA (2004) (describing how conservative emphasis on social issues caused many
Americans to vote against their economic self-interest).
267
See supra pp. 422–23.
268
Id.
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Second, the resolution fell victim to the populist conceit that there was
a united, virtuous, and wise “people,” which could somehow be given voice
without distortion produced by intermediate institutions.269 Of course, in the
real world, the people are not united and are not always virtuous or wise.270
Because the people are not united, mechanisms must be put in place to
measure how many people favor one policy over another. As a later
generation of political theorists demonstrated, any means of aggregating
conflicting preferences produces distortions.271 The populist conceit that
elections would reveal an unpolluted general will was therefore naïve.
Worse yet, even before these mediating institutions take hold, public opinion
never exists in antiseptic form. Opinions and preferences are always situated
within a matrix of power, culture, and politics.272
Because people are not always virtuous or wise, filtering mechanisms
are sometimes necessary to make reform effectual. Populist romantics
assumed that there were simple solutions to problems of social justice. If
only the people were allowed to rule, social disintegration could be halted,
and economic misery could be eradicated. But, of course, solutions are rarely
simple. Real government programs that really ameliorate economic
dislocation must deal with complex problems and avoid unintended
consequences. That requires experts who do not have to respond to the
immediate demands of a sometimes ill-informed electorate.
These weaknesses left populism vulnerable to a right-wing takeover.
When populist efforts to establish direct democracy predictably failed, either
because it could not be effectuated or because, once effectuated, it produced
disappointing outcomes, populists were left with no solution to the problem
of plutocratic government. In the absence of a solution, populist focus
concentrated on the second evil—cultural denigration. The movement turned
to the politics of despair and grievance. With the hope of democratic
transformation shattered, all that remained of the populist impulse was
distrust of government as currently constituted—a distrust reinforced by
exogenous shocks like Vietnam, Watergate, the failure to find weapons of
mass destruction in Iraq, and the Great Recession. The upshot was a populism
that was more aligned with conservative opposition to government regulation
than with traditional left-wing arguments for government intervention.
269

Id.
See, e.g., GALSTON, supra note 29, at 38 (noting that “[p]lurality, not homogeneity, characterizes
most peoples most of the time”).
271
For a short statement of “Arrow’s Theorem” demonstrating that under certain conditions voting
cannot achieve stable outcomes, see KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 60
(3d ed. 2012). For a summary of the problems with democratic aggregation uncovered by public choice
theory, see generally JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997).
272
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some
Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–8 (2011) (explaining how motivated cognition
distorts perceptions); Anca M. Miron, Nyla R. Branscombe & Monica Biernat, Motivated Shifting of
Justice Standards, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 768, 768 (2010) (same).
270
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Matters were made worse by populism’s historic association with
Manichean and conspiratorial thinking that intersected in toxic ways with
deeply engrained American racism. Like their forbearers, modern populists
attribute their misfortunes to the evil scheming of people who are not part of
“the people”—elites, immigrants, and racial minorities.273 Once detached
from a more optimistic and inclusive politics directed at popular control and
government reform, the attribution produces free-floating cultural
resentment and nihilistic rage.
This transformation has had its most profound effect on our general
political culture, but it has also influenced modern constitutional culture.
Counterintuitive as it might seem, we stand at the threshold of a populist
constitutional moment.
The claim seems counterintuitive because the modern Supreme Court is
the most business-friendly in memory. Over a wide range of issues,
including administrative law,274 access to justice,275 free speech law,276 and
statutory construction,277 the Court has systematically favored business
interests. But the violated intuition is rooted in outdated assumptions about
populism’s leftward tilt. Most of the emerging conservative constitutional
agenda is compatible with or has roots in a modern populism that has given
up on government.278
273

See, e.g., GALSTON, supra note 29, at 4–5, 19–21 (describing populist conspiracy theories).
See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (holding that the
Department of Labor failed to engage in a reasonable process when it interpreted the Fair Labor Standards
Act to require certain employers to pay certain employees overtime); Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 131
(2012) (holding that an EPA compliance order was a final agency action subject to APA review); Entergy
Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009) (holding that EPA permissibly considered costs and
benefits before promulgating rules).
275
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348–60 (2011) (restricting commonality
and particularity requirements for class action lawsuits); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346,
352–54 (2007) (limiting punitive damage awards).
276
See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460
(2018) (holding that compelled contributions to unions by government employees violates freedom of
speech); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342–43 (2010) (holding that corporations have a First
Amendment right to expend money in conjunction with political campaign); McCullen v. Coakley, 134
S. Ct. 2518, 2541 (2014) (holding that a statute establishing a “buffer zone” around abortion clinics
violates the First Amendment).
277
See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 719 (2014) (holding that “person,”
within meaning of Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s protection of a person’s exercise of religion,
includes for-profit corporations); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1612 (2018) (holding that
the Federal Arbitration Act’s savings clause does not permit courts to reject “arbitration agreements
waiving collective action procedures for claims under the [Fair Labor Standards Act] and class action
procedures for claims under state law”).
278
I do not mean to deny that there are populist movements—Black Lives Matter or Occupy Wall
Street, for example—that oppose the Court’s agenda. See generally David Fontana, Unbundling
Populism, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1482 (2018) (distinguishing between left and right populism); Bojan
Bugaric, The Two Faces of Populism: Between Authoritarian and Democratic Populism, 20 GERMAN
L.J. 390 (2018) (distinguishing between different types of populism). My argument is that the Justices
have succeeded in muddying the waters by appropriating populist rhetoric to reverse its ideological
valence.
274
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The emerging alliance between populists and conservatives is most
obvious with regard to the regulatory state. In its most extreme form, and
when combined with populist conspiracy theories, the attack morphs into
worries about the “deep state” that secretly controls the government. For
now at least, these worries bother only people associated with the Trump
Administration or otherwise vulnerable to paranoid fantasies.279 However,
more moderate versions of the same claims are poised to become part of
mainstream constitutional thinking.280 Advocates of the unitary executive,281
of overruling Chevron,282 of revival of the nondelegation doctrine,283 and of
“the constitution in exile,”284 claim that the federal bureaucracy is
unaccountable, undemocratic, and populated by elites who fail to understand
American values.
Of course, conservatives and populists often have different motives for
these attacks. For some conservatives, the regulatory state is dangerous
because of its potential to upset the economic status quo, which they view
as just and desirable. Right-wing populists, in contrast, often remain angry
at economic injustice. They have lost their faith in the possibility of radical
transformation of government that would make it a force for good rather
279
See, e.g., GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS, DEEP STATE TARGET: HOW I GOT CAUGHT IN THE
CROSSHAIRS OF THE PLOT TO BRING DOWN PRESIDENT TRUMP 6–11 (2019) (describing the “deep state”).
280
Consider, for example, the following comments by Chief Justice Roberts:

The Framers could hardly have envisioned today’s “vast and varied federal
bureaucracy” and the authority administrative agencies now hold over our economic,
social, and political activities. . . .
Although the Constitution empowers the President to keep federal officers
accountable, administrative agencies enjoy in practice a significant degree of
independence. As scholars have noted, “no President (or his executive office staff) could,
and presumably none would wish to, supervise so broad a swath of regulatory activity.”
. . . President Truman colorfully described his power over the administrative state by
complaining, “I thought I was the president, but when it comes to these bureaucrats, I
can’t do a damn thing.” . . . President Kennedy once told a constituent, “I agree with you,
but I don’t know if the government will.” . . . The collection of agencies housed outside
the traditional executive departments, including the Federal Communications
Commission, is routinely described as the “headless fourth branch of government,”
reflecting not only the scope of their authority but their practical independence.
City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 313–14 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
281
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1153 (1992) (arguing in favor of the unitary
executive theory); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 548–50 (1994) (same).
282
See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (arguing that Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
should be overruled).
283
See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131–48 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(arguing for revival of the nondelegation doctrine); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43,
66–91 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (same).
284
See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 18 REG., no. 1, at 83, 83–84 (1995)
(reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993)).
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than evil. Faced with the choice between “free” markets and rule by corrupt
government elites who have no understanding of their culture and values,
many modern populists are prepared to choose the former.
A second, closely related prong of the conservative constitutional
agenda—the revival of federalism and of judicially enforced limits on
congressional power—has similar populist roots. No doubt, many
conservatives favor these changes because the federal government poses the
greatest threat of enacting and enforcing redistributive programs.285
However, the judicial rhetoric of federalism rarely mentions this fear.
Instead, the Justices regularly resort to rhetoric about the need for
government close to the people and accountable to popular opinion—
rhetoric that is long associated with the populist critique.286
The most interesting overlap between conservative constitutionalism
and modern populism pertains to civil liberties. Consider Justice Thomas’s
startling rediscovery of the debate over evolution and eugenics, along with
his use of these disputes to challenge progressive orthodoxy. In his separate
opinion in Box v. Planned Parenthood—defending abortion restrictions—
he devotes nineteen pages of the U.S. Reports to an extended essay about
abortion, eugenics,287 and Darwinian thought.288 All three are identified with
“progressives, professionals, and intellectual elites.”289 The analogy between
state mandated sterilization and individual choices about childrearing is far
from perfect,290 but that fact should not distract us from the way in which
Justice Thomas takes advantage of early twentieth century populist tropes.
Like William Jennings Bryan before him, Justice Thomas reinterprets
progressive support for individual rights as an effort to control subordinate
groups that, in his view, make progressives uncomfortable. He thinks that
285
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 149
(1992) (noting that exit rights provided by federalism protect individuals from government regulation).
286
See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (stating accountability is
“diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the
views of the local electorate . . . .”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state
concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between
the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.
. . . The resultant inability to hold either branch of the government answerable to the citizens is more
dangerous even than devolving too much authority to the remote central power.”).
287
Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 587 U.S. ___, ___-___, 138 S. Ct. 1780 (2019)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
288
138 S. Ct. at 1784 (noting that “eugenics is rooted in social Darwinism”).
289
Id.
290
See Adam Cohen, Clarence Thomas Knows Nothing of My Work: The Justice Used My Book to
Tie Abortion to Eugenics. But His Rendition of the History is Incorrect., ATLANTIC (May 29, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/clarence-thomas-used-my-book-argue-againstabortion/590455 (“Between eugenic sterilization and abortion lie two crucial differences: who is making
the decision, and why they are making it. In eugenic sterilization, the state decides who may not
reproduce, and acts with the goal of ‘improving’ the population. In abortion, a woman decides not to
reproduce, for personal reasons related to a specific pregnancy.”).
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progressive support for abortion rights is connected to their historical
support for eugenics and to the belief that some groups are genetically
inferior to others.291
Similarly, the Court’s emerging concern for the rights of conservative
Christians292 echoes in obvious ways the worries that brought Bryan out of
retirement almost a century ago.293 The Court has moved strongly to
protect prayer in public places,294 religious monuments and displays on
public land,295 and, somewhat less strongly, Christian businesspeople who
do not want to provide service to gay customers or contraception coverage
to their employees.296
The Court has also moved to restrict affirmative action programs
thought to harm the white middle and lower classes.297 Instead of
conceptualizing these programs as remedying centuries of racism, it has
focused on powerless whites, whose victimhood amounts to the unnoticed
byproduct of elite, racial condescension.298
291

Box, 138 S. Ct. at 1783.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 733 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
constitutional right to same sex marriage threatens religious liberty); id. at 741 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(arguing that decision upholding the right to same sex marriage “will be used to vilify Americans who
are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy”); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 736
(2014) (holding that Religious Freedom Restoration Act gave corporations with religious objections to
birth control the right to an exemption from a mandate that these services be provided to employees);
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018) (invalidating on free
exercise grounds state civil rights commission decision to issue a cease and desist order against merchant
who refused to sell wedding cake to a same sex couple).
293
In keeping with the conservative cooptation of populism, the decisions echo Bryan’s concern
about the denigration of religious values, but not Bryan’s association between Christianity and social
justice. See supra pp. 428–29.
294
See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 591–92 (2014) (upholding practice of beginning
town board meetings with prayers almost always delivered by Christian clergy against Establishment
Clause attack).
295
See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2090 (2019) (upholding placement
on public land of Roman cross as part of World War I memorial); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,
691–92 (2005) (holding that placement of a six-foot-high monolith inscribed with the Ten
Commandments on state capitol grounds did not violate Establishment Clause); Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (holding that a privately donated Ten Commandments memorial in
a public park was “government speech,” and, therefore, did not create a public forum where there was a
right to engage in competing speech).
296
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (2018) (invalidating on narrow grounds state civil
rights commission decision to issue a cease and desist order against merchant who refused to sell wedding
cake to a same sex couple); Burwell, 573 U.S. at 736 (2014) (holding that Religious Freedom Restoration
Act gave corporations with religious objections to birth control the right to an exemption from a mandate
that these services be provided to employees).
297
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275–76 (2003) (invalidating University of Michigan’s
affirmative action program). Cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 747–48 (2007) (invalidating race conscious voluntary desegregation plan). But cf. Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343–44 (2003) (utilizing strict scrutiny but upholding affirmative action
program); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214–15 (2016) (same).
298
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part an concurring in the judgment) (“There can be no doubt that the paternalism that
appears to lie at the heart of this [affirmative action] program is at war with the principle of inherent
292
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Finally, the Court has greatly expanded free speech protection,
especially as it relates to the regulation of business.299 These cases illustrate
better than any other both the oddity and the effectiveness of the
conservative-populist alliance. In obvious ways, the new freedom of speech
advances the conservative agenda. It shields economic actors from the threat
of government-mandated redistribution. One might think that populists would
favor this redistribution, but their worry is the mirror image of conservative
fears. For them, the threat is not a government devoted to redistribution, but
a government captured by the rich and powerful—the very conservative
elements with which they are allied. An alliance like this seems bound to
disintegrate, and there are indeed tensions within it that might be
exploited.300 Still, these complementary but contradictory concerns have
provided powerful motivation for both sides, especially when combined
with progressive nostalgia and sentimentality about freedom of speech.
When the Court announces these decisions, it typically utilizes the dry
language of constitutional exegesis and statutory construction, but occasionally,
the raw rhetoric of populism seeps through. Consider, for example, Justice
Scalia’s attack on his colleagues for their support for gay rights:
[T]he Federal Judiciary is hardly a cross-section of America.
Take, for example, this Court, which consists of only nine men
and women, all of them successful lawyers who studied at
Harvard or Yale Law School. Four of the nine are natives of New
York City. Eight of them grew up in east- and west-coast States.
Only one hails from the vast expanse in-between. Not a single
Southwesterner or even, to tell the truth, a genuine Westerner
(California does not count). Not a single evangelical Christian (a
group that comprises about one quarter of Americans), or even a
Protestant of any denomination. . . . [T]o allow the policy
question of same-sex marriage to be considered and resolved by
a select, patrician, highly unrepresentative panel of nine is to
violate a principle even more fundamental than no taxation without
representation: no social transformation without representation.301
equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution.”); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 367–68 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (attacking “‘legacy’ preference[s]” in “elite institutions” as part
of his argument against affirmative action); id. at 368 (asserting that “there is nothing ancient, honorable,
or constitutionally protected about ‘selective’ admissions”).
299
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 580 (2011) (holding that statute prohibiting
the sale and disclosure of pharmacy records that reveal the prescribing practices of individual doctors
violates the First Amendment); Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151–52
(2017) (holding that a statute that prohibits merchants from offering a discount in exchange for paying
with cash regulates speech). Cf. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S.
Ct. 2248, 2486 (2018) (holding that compelled payment of “agency fees” to unions representing
employees of a public entity violates free speech).
300
See infra p. 469.
301
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 717–18 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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With appropriate modifications, William Jennings Bryan might have
said the same thing almost a century earlier. Like Bryan before him, Scalia
voiced the suspicion that what progressives think of as protection for
minority rights is actually a cover for elite denigration of the beliefs of
ordinary Americans.
Similarly, consider how Justice Thomas defends his position that the
University of Michigan has failed to demonstrate a “compelling state
interest” justifying its affirmative action program. Like populists of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Thomas worries that wealthy and
powerful interests are systematically devaluing the welfare of the middle and
lower classes. On his view:
[t]he [University of Michigan] Law School’s decision to be an
elite institution does little to advance the welfare of the people
of Michigan or any cognizable interest of the State of
Michigan . . . . With the adoption of different admissions
methods, such as accepting all students who meet minimum
qualifications, . . . the Law School could achieve its vision . . . .302
A cynic might respond to this rhetoric by doubting the good faith of the
people who use it. On this view, conservatives are manipulating, rather than
embracing, populists. They are using populist tropes to advance causes that
are detrimental to the real interests of the dispossessed. Perhaps this view is
correct. As I have already argued, the conservative-populist alliance is
fragile and vulnerable. That said, the view elides the undeniable fact that
both the rhetoric and the positions that the rhetoric supports have deep roots
For similar rhetoric, see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636, 652–53 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting):
This Court has no business imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored by
the elite class from which the Members of this institution are selected . . . .
When the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with the knights
rather than the villeins—and more specifically with the Templars, reflecting the views
and values of the lawyer class from which the Court’s Members are drawn. How that
class feels about homosexuality will be evident to anyone who wishes to interview
job applicants at virtually any of the Nation’s law schools. The interviewer may refuse
to offer a job because the applicant is a Republican; because he is an adulterer; because
he went to the wrong prep school or belongs to the wrong country club; because he
eats snails; because he is a womanizer; because she wears real-animal fur; or even
because he hates the Chicago Cubs. But if the interviewer should wish not to be an
associate or partner of an applicant because he disapproves of the applicant’s
homosexuality, then he will have violated the pledge which the Association of
American Law Schools requires . . . . This law-school view of what “prejudices” must
be stamped out may be contrasted with the more plebeian attitudes that apparently
still prevail in the United States Congress, which has been unresponsive to repeated
attempts to extend to homosexuals the protections of federal civil rights laws . . . and
which took the pains to exclude them specifically from the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990.
302

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 360, 362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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in the American populist tradition. Moreover, the view itself has similarly
deep roots in the progressive tradition. It reflects the longstanding
progressive inclination to believe that ordinary people do not know what is
best for themselves and must be guided by elites who better understand their
interests. That view, in turn, ignores the role that progressives have played
in populist disillusionment. That is the subject of the next section.
B. Progressive Loss of Faith
Historically, populist distrust in government was countered or at least
leavened by successful progressive social reform. From the Square Deal
through the Great Society, progressives met populist claims that the
government was irretrievably corrupt with actual programs that improved
the lives of vulnerable people. That success, in turn, reinforced the strains in
populist thinking that had always been sympathetic to at least some forms of
government activism.
Two trends beginning in the 1960s and reaching a climax in our own
period have sharply limited this ability of progressives to temper populist
distrust of government.
The first trend related to the progressives’ turn toward racial justice.
Throughout the New Deal period and its immediate aftermath, race was far
from the center of the progressive agenda. As the eugenics controversy
illustrates, some early progressives believed in “scientific racism.”303 Even
when elite opinion changed, New Dealers were willing to embrace a bargain
that exchanged white Southern support for New Deal programs for New
Deal acceptance of segregation and racial subordination.304
In the wake of the New Deal, there were sporadic attempts to break the
stranglehold that the South held over the Democratic Party. President
Roosevelt made a spectacularly unsuccessful attempt to purge southern
conservatives from his coalition in 1938,305 and northern Democrats were
willing to accept a southern walkout from the 1948 convention in order to
enact a civil rights plank in their platform.306 But it was not until the Warren
Court period and the election of Lyndon Johnson that progressives broke
decisively with the racist south.307

303

Supra p. 424 and note 63.
See IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 151, 159–
60 (2013) (describing New Deal’s accommodation of southern racists).
305
See, e.g., WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 1932–
1940, at 268 (1963) (explaining that Roosevelt experienced “a humiliating drubbing”). For a more
nuanced account that nonetheless reaches the same conclusion, see Charles M. Price & Joseph Boskin,
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When they did so, as Johnson himself had predicted,308 progressives
provoked a huge populist backlash.309 As already noted, populism had a
long, if not entirely unbroken, history of racism.310 With the emergence of
progressive support for racial justice, many populists now saw the
redistributive programs that they had previously supported through the lens
of racial division. The upshot was a reinforcement of populist distrust of
government and increased suspicion of progressive elites.
The second trend involved a retrenchment of progressive ambition.
Progressivism was never as radical as populism. Historically, progressives
tended to be insiders rather than outsiders and reformers rather than
revolutionaries.311 Still, programs like Medicare, Social Security, and the GI
Bill of Rights provided material evidence of the government’s capacity to
improve the lives of ordinary citizens.
In recent years, however, progressive enthusiasm for large-scale reform
has declined. When progressives were actually in power, they ended
“welfare as we know it,”312 embarked on a massive deregulatory program,313
and promoted a “free trade” system that some perceived as decimating
American labor.314 Many progressives made their peace with Wall Street and
with a regulatory regime that is more facilitative than disruptive. Piecemeal
reform, exemplified by the Affordable Care Act,315 the Dodd-Frank banking
reforms,316 and the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reforms,317 have
marginally improved the functioning of economic and political markets, but
exponentially increased their complexity and opacity.
Having now regained power, some progressives are again promising
sweeping changes. Proposals for universal health care, free college tuition,
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and broad-based changes in the tax code abound.318 But other progressives
are doubtful at best about these measures,319 and it remains to be seen
whether a Democratic president and Congress will actually attempt, much
less succeed, in implementing them.
This decline of progressive ambition resulted, at least in part, from the
converse of the contradiction that destroyed left-leaning populism. Whereas
populists had to reconcile their support for revolutionary change with their
distrust of the government that might bring the change about, progressives
needed to reconcile their support for elite institutions with sympathy for the
kind of people routinely excluded from those institutions.
For populists, the contradiction was resolved by sullen distrust of
government. For progressives, it has been resolved by a combination of deep
pessimism and patrician paternalism. Faith in government has remained, but
it is faith in a government staffed by policy experts who are resistant to
“simplistic” redistributive schemes and paralyzed by their understanding of
the complexities of market regulation and the possibilities of unintended
consequences. This stance, reinforced by the dependence of the Democratic
party on large and wealthy donors, makes many modern progressives
suspicious of “demagogic” proposals that, in their view, are likely to make
things worse rather than better and are, in any event, politically unattainable.320
In the absence of a broad-based social vision, progressives have often
retreated to incrementalism, a reflexive defense of social programs already in
place, and a devotion to identity politics in support of various minority groups,
more and more narrowly defined, thought to be subject to discrimination.
These stances, in turn, erode the sense that progressives stand for the general
public good and suggest that they are instead catering to entrenched interests.
The result is that, at least until recently, modern progressives offered no
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counterweight to populist distrust of government. Instead, they reinforce the
view that there is no real hope for meaningful social change.321
Like the evolution of populism, the changed focus for progressives is
most evident in the general political culture. Unsurprisingly, though, it too
manifests itself in constitutional doctrine. Progressives on the Supreme
Court continue to defend “expert agenc[ies]” who engage in “sensible
regulation.”322 They worry about the ability of juries to evaluate pseudoscientific evidence not derived from “the scientific method” and not exposed
to peer review by other, recognized scientists.323 They still rail against public
policy that vindicates what they identify as religious, rather than secular,
purposes.324 What has gone missing, though, is the progressive faith in
constitutional law as an engine for serious reform.
Even progressives who promise profound change if they gain political
power rarely speak of constitutionally driven transformation. Instead,
progressive constitutionalists have become the new reactionaries. They have
devoted all their energy to worshiping the relics of past glory days without
any real hope that the relics might be removed from museums and actually
put to good use.325
The one exception to this generalization proves the rule. Progressives on
the Court have pushed through an important reform agenda regarding the
civil rights of LGBTQ Americans, culminating in the realization of the
long-held dream of a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.326 There is
no denying that this is a victory for justice that has made the lives of millions
of Americans better. But the victory also reflects some of the most
problematic aspects of the progressive tradition. Like the progressive
embrace of abortion rights, the constitutionalization of LGBTQ rights is
premised on the belief that authentic disputes about morality can be resolved
by reason if only people will accept uncontroversial first premises. That
assumption is linked to a disdain for conventional religious attitudes and a
belief that the value judgments of the educated classes are not value
321
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Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 33 (1999) (“[T]he new constitutional order is one in
which the aspiration of achieving justice directly through law has been substantially chastened. Instead,
justice is to be achieved not by national legislation identifying and seeking to promote it, but by individual
responsibility and market processes.”).
322
Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 343 (2014) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
323
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590–96 (1993).
324
See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 566 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“I am persuaded that the absence of any secular purpose for the legislative declarations
that life begins at conception and that conception occurs at fertilization makes the relevant portion of the
preamble invalid under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution.”).
325
See Tushnet, supra note 321, at 64 (noting that “the Warren Court is dead in the sense that the
current Court will undertake no dramatic initiatives, but its aspirations—chastened as they are—mean
that there will be few dramatic retrenchments on established doctrine either”).
326
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).

464

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:2

judgments at all, but instead the necessary outcome of disinterested
rationality. Put differently, here, as in the past, individual rights rhetoric
masks resistance to mass control of government power.
Apart from LGBTQ rights, it is hard to think of any important goal that
modern progressive Justices believe could be achieved through
constitutional, judicial intervention. There is little remaining interest in
constitutionalizing the rights of the poor, judicially led fundamental reform
of the criminal justice system, or transforming race relations. Instead,
progressive constitutionalists now occupy themselves with an entirely
defensive and only occasionally successful effort to preserve the remains of
a fast-receding past.
Progressive support for affirmative action provides a particularly
striking example. The original logic of Brown pushed toward a rejection of
formal equality and a requirement of affirmative, constitutionally compelled
government action to dismantle racial hierarchies.327 Formal equality
between the races—a separate but equal regime, with black and white students
alike prohibited from attending integrated schools—was unconstitutional
because of its actual impact.328 This kind of formal equality “affect[ed] the[]
hearts and minds” of Black students “in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.”329 It followed from this view that the formal dismantling of racebased legal structures was insufficient to meet the government’s constitutional
responsibilities. Instead, school boards were constitutionally obligated to
develop affirmative plans for integration that actually “work[ed]” and
“work[ed] now.”330 Necessarily, those programs had to be race-conscious.331
A modern translation of this approach would make affirmative action
not just constitutionally permissible but constitutionally mandatory. It would
require actual desegregation of private and public schools throughout the
country. Indeed, taken to the limits of its logic, it would mandate a wide
variety of sweeping affirmative measures designed to dismantle all
manifestations of racial hierarchy. But no modern Justice takes this
argument seriously. Instead, liberals on the Court have acquiesced to a
standard that makes affirmative action constitutionally problematic.332 They
have fought an entirely defensive battle to preserve a few voluntary
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programs that create some of the optics of a racially just society while doing
little to help the least advantaged or to promote a racial transformation.
Worse yet, the apologetic stance of liberals serves to reinforce rather
than attack racial stereotypes. By acquiescing in the assumption that
affirmative action is a necessary but limited departure from otherwise
unproblematic standards of merit, they communicate a belief that African
Americans can succeed only if they are given special privileges.
A left-populist stance on affirmative action might have countered this
condescending narrative. It might have built upon, rather than rejected,
Justice Thomas’s critique of meritocracy to support the opposite of the
outcomes that Justice Thomas favors.333 Liberal justices might have insisted
that the elite standards of “merit” that govern college and graduate school
admissions reflect no more than the eminently contestable views of the rich
and powerful as to who is deserving of privilege. Maintaining these
standards hardly constitutes sufficient grounds for denying equal
opportunity to all. But while this argument might be advanced by populists,
it is not in the progressive playbook. Progressives are too committed to
norms of objectivity and rationality to challenge the implicit bias that infects
the effort to measure these qualities.
Affirmative action law is emblematic of the sad state of progressive
constitutionalism, but it is not unique. The progressive position on gender
discrimination suffers from similar problems. More than forty years ago,
progressive constitutionalism produced some important victories for gender
equality by removing overt gender distinctions from the law.334 The effort
played to progressivism’s strength. Progressive Justices insisted on the
necessity of neutral and objective standards that should replace oldfashioned, irrational stereotypes about sex and gender.
But that program ran out of steam long ago. Today, formal equality has
become an end in itself, divorced from the ambition of actually promoting
justice. Sessions v. Morales-Santana,335 a decision authored by Justice
Ginsburg, the champion of progressive feminism, illustrates the point.
At issue was the United States citizenship of a child born to unmarried
parents when only one parent was a United States citizen.336 The law
provided that if the child’s father was a United States citizen, the child was
entitled to citizenship if the father had lived in the United States for five
years prior to the child’s birth.337 In contrast, if the unmarried mother was a
United States citizen, she could transmit citizenship to her child if she had
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lived in the United States for only one year.338 The Court held that this
gender-based distinction violated the equal protection component of the Due
Process Clause.339
As Justice Ginsburg implicitly acknowledged in her opinion for the
Court,340 the decision amounted to a mopping-up operation. It dealt with a
statute enacted more than three-quarters of a century ago341—one of the few
remaining laws in the United States Code providing for facially differential
treatment based on gender. The Court used by now familiar rules about
heightened scrutiny for laws that are based on overbroad gender stereotypes
to invalidate it.
As it happens, though, the stereotype—that unmarried mothers are more
likely to influence the upbringing of their children than unmarried fathers—
is almost certainly statistically accurate. Moreover, the statute actually
provided better treatment for women than for men. If the stereotype is indeed
accurate, eliminating the differential treatment arguably hinders rather than
advances gender justice.
Having found that the unequal treatment was unconstitutional, the Court
nonetheless denied the plaintiff relief.342 Because inequality can be remedied
by either ratcheting up or ratcheting down, and because, according to the
Court, Congress would have preferred to ratchet down, the decision solved
the inequality problem by denying the more generous citizenship rule to
everyone.343 The upshot is that even though the plaintiff “won” his case,
people like him did not benefit from the victory. Tragically, citizenship is
now available to a smaller number of people than enjoyed the benefit before
the Court acted. In order to protect men from supposed discrimination, many
more people are now subject to deportation. Can this be what progressive,
constitutional feminism has turned into?
In some respects, Morales-Santana is aberrational. The case is important
because it illustrates what progressive constitutionalists tend to do with their
power when they have it and, perhaps, why they now so seldom have it. But
today, progressive Justices rarely write majority opinions. Even if they
wanted to, they are no longer positioned to offer a positive alternative to the
pessimism of modern populists. It is hard to see a scenario under which they

338
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will be back in control in the immediate future. Instead, a
conservative-populist majority will be in the driver’s seat.
That fact, in turn, provides space for thinking about what might hasten
a progressive return to power. Might progressives yet pry populists away
from conservative pessimism? Is there a way to reconcile populist
skepticism about government with progressive faith in the possibilities of
reform? That is the subject of the Conclusion.
CONCLUSION: IS THERE A WAY FORWARD?
This Article has focused on two sets of contradictions that plague the
moderate American left. The first set relates to American liberalism as a
whole. Many liberals believe that the government is thoroughly corrupted
by the role that money plays in our politics, yet they also believe that
expanded government will be a force for social justice. They have failed to
explain how a corrupted government can serve as such a force.
The second set relates to the progressive and populist components of
American constitutionalism. Progressives believe in government intervention,
but they have struggled to explain how that belief can be reconciled with
their libertarian stance toward putative constitutional rights like free speech
and reproductive freedom. Populists distrust government, but it is hard to
reconcile that stance with their civil liberties skepticism in cases involving
matters like the rights of religious minorities in public schools.
Together, these contradictions have hobbled American liberalism. They
help explain why, from the perspective of American liberals, things have
spun out of control. If this analysis is right, then resolving the contradictions
is a matter of some urgency. Can they be resolved?
There can be no complete resolution of the first contradiction, at least if
we are prepared to give full force to both sides of it. If government is truly
and irredeemably corrupt, then we cannot look to government to ameliorate
the country’s social and moral deficiencies. To claim on the one hand that
the plutocrats control all levers of power in Washington, but on the other
that we should, for example, turn over our healthcare system to the federal
government, is simply nonsensical.
Absent an external shock that produces truly revolutionary change, this
problem is unlikely to go away. It follows that liberal victories are fated to
be fragile and partial. It does not follow, though, that nothing at all can be
accomplished. It remains possible to make things marginally better if we
decline to give full force to either side of the argument. Perhaps the
government is sometimes, but not always, corrupt. Perhaps government can
sometimes, but not always, push toward social justice.
At its best moments, American liberalism has pragmatically adjusted
policy to navigate between the progressive and populist positions. On the
one hand, populists have a point when they emphasize the risk of
government capture. When the risk is serious, liberals should insist on
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popular control and be skeptical of government intervention when that
control is not in place. On the other, populists must recognize that the only
realistic hope of countering private power is through government regulation.
They need to pay attention when progressives point to historical examples
of when government regulation, at least for a time, authentically advanced
the general welfare.344
Of course, actually assembling political majorities for reform presents
difficult problems. I am hardly in a position to provide a roadmap or
checklist. One thing seems relatively clear, though: putting together such a
coalition is ultimately a political and practical problem, rather than a
conceptual and theoretical one. Instead of focusing on theoretical, global
contradictions that can drive people apart, successful politicians focus on
local, practical compromise that can bring them together.
It does not follow, though, that politicians should altogether ignore the
forces that have driven progressives and populists apart. Liberals will need
to regain the trust of populists suspicious of progressivism. That will require
more sensitivity to populist concerns about denigration of their mores and
beliefs, more flexibility and openness in administering reforms, and, most
significantly, more of the courage, creativity, and determination necessary
to advance serious reform. All this is easier said than done, but the problems
are resolvable at least in principle, and recent events suggest that things are
moving in the right direction.
What about the narrower problems of liberal constitutionalism? The first
step forward is a diagnosis of the problem’s causes. At bottom, progressive
support for civil liberties is not what it seems to be. As Justice Jackson’s
pained concession in Barnette illustrates,345 an authentic embrace of
individual rights would be inconsistent with progressive faith in collective
decision-making. The progressive contradiction disappears when one
realizes that progressive concern has often been more about elite power than
individual rights. Similarly, populist rejection of civil liberties is easy to
misunderstand. A true defense of untrammeled public power would be
inconsistent with populist fears of government corruption. The populist
344
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contradiction disappears when one realizes that the populist concern is more
about preventing government denigration of ordinary citizens than about
protecting government prerogatives.
This diagnosis, in turn, leads to possibilities for solutions. As a practical
matter, conservatives are likely to be in control of the Supreme Court for the
immediate future. Still, the situation would be improved if it were possible
to rupture the alliance between constitutional conservatives and populists.
Conservatives should be forced to defend their deregulatory agenda on its
merits without hiding behind populist rhetoric.346
Rupturing the alliance is work that populists will have to do for
themselves; progressives who think that lecturing others will achieve their
goal are once again indulging their propensity for elite condescension. There
are nonetheless things that progressives can do to ease the transition.
Resolving the first contradiction is an important step in the right direction.
If progressives succeed in formulating and defending government programs
that achieve and are perceived to achieve real benefits, populist
constitutionalist distrust of government may wane. That change in attitude,
in turn, might produce more skepticism about conservative populist rhetoric.
Change in the general political environment is part of the solution, but
there also needs to be change within liberal constitutionalism itself.
Progressives must stop insisting that disputes about value can be definitively
resolved by disinterested, lawyerly exegesis of the Constitution. They need
to stop pretending that their constitutional positions are ones that all rational
and sensible people must accept. That insistence mistakes partial, elite
viewpoints for universal principle. The mistake will be corrected only when
progressives stop demanding adherence to civil liberties orthodoxy and give
up the authoritarian insistence that the Constitution simply requires the
results that they favor.
A few academics have shown that there is a way forward. A generation
ago, Richard Parker’s path-breaking defense of populist constitutionalism
effectively attacked liberal orthodoxy.347 More recent work by scholars like,
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Larry Kramer,348 Sanford Levinson,349 Joseph Fishkin and William
Forbath,350 Ganesh Sitaraman,351 David Fontana,352 Rosalind Dixon and
Julie Suk,353 and Mark Tushnet354 have demonstrated how a certain kind of
constitutionalism might be reconciled with populist impulses. One might
embrace the overarching goals of the Constitution––the ambition to provide
for the common defense and for the general welfare, and to ensure that all
American inhabitants enjoy equal protection and due process––without
insisting that these shared commitments are more than an invitation to a
conversation about what is to be done.
But most of these scholars are working on the fringes of American
liberalism. The American Constitution Society, the semi-official voice of
liberal constitutionalism, too often speaks in favor of a constitutionalism that
is legalistic, proscriptive, and elitist.355 The Society’s allies in law schools
and on the courts have similar commitments.
It does not follow that liberals should silently acquiesce to the worst
impulses embedded in the populist tradition. They can and must stand strong
against racism, misogyny, xenophobia, and homophobia.356 Progressives
have much to learn from populists, but populists, too, must do some learning.
Importantly, though, the learning will come only when progressives are
willing to defend their position on the merits and not simply rely on
constitutional compulsion.
Once these goals are accomplished, progressives and populists can begin
to have a real discussion about the prerequisites for a decent society. It would
be expecting too much to suppose that these conversations will produce a
348
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permanent détente. The gap between progressive and populist sensibilities
is too wide and the history of conflict too fraught to produce a lasting
coalition. At some future point, frustration, resentment, and anger will again
drive the two sides of liberalism apart, as they always have in the past.
But if periods of rupture are part of the history of modern liberalism, so
too are periods when contradictions have been papered over and old
divisions patched up. An overlapping consensus has emerged in the past,
and it can emerge in the future. Temporary though it may be, such a
consensus is more important now than ever before as we face the looming
possibility of social and constitutional disintegration.

